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1 Introduction
What is the appropriate domain of a currency area? It might seem at first that the
question is purely academic since it hardly appears within the realm of political feasi-
bility that national currencies would ever be abandoned in favor of any other arrange-
ment.(...) Certain parts of the world are undergoing processes of economic integration
and disintegration, new experiments are being made and a conception of what consti-
tutes an optimum currency area can clarify the meaning of these experiments.[Mundell
(1961)]
Today Robert Mundell’s words appear prophetic. The debate on the creation and en-
largement of the Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union (EMU) and
more recently the euro crisis have brought to the fore the question which countries
should form or join a currency area. The costs of losing monetary autonomy are well
known: when countries share the same currency, monetary policy cannot properly sta-
bilize country-specific shocks. By contrast, the sources of welfare benefits that can
rationalize the existence of a currency area have been less clearly identified,1 casting
serious doubts on the desirability of sharing a common currency like the euro.
This paper revisits the issue of the appropriate domain of a currency area, and
specifically of the euro area, within a multi-country New-Keynesian open economy
framework in which the objectives of the policy makers are fully micro-founded – i.e.,
derived directly from the welfare of the representative household.2 To our knowledge,
we are the first to study within this class of models to what extent the process of
formation and enlargement of a monetary union like the eurozone entails beneficial
effects for its citizens by comparing the welfare gains of the adoption of a common
currency or the extension of the currency area with the costs of renouncing country-
specific stabilization policies. According to our main results, there can be welfare gains
from sharing a common currency as long as the currency area is formed by a group of
small open economies. Similarly, it can be desirable to enlarge the currency area to
another group of small open economies. Conversely, integrating the monetary union
with another big country cannot bring about sizable welfare benefits. Put differently,
according to our findings, while the adoption of the euro and the process of eurozone
enlargement including the Eastern European countries is likely to entail welfare benefits
for all the countries involved, there is no reason to try to implement a monetary union
between the eurozone and the U.S.
In the model, the source of welfare gains from adopting a common currency is
the internalization of a standard terms of trade externality according to which open
economy policy makers try to manipulate the terms of trade in order to outsource labor
effort at other countries’ expense. This externality has been extensively studied in the
open macro literature,3 which however, tends to underestimate the ensued welfare
losses, by usually considering a two country setup.4 Differently, we use a multi-country
1As emphasized by the so-called Delors report (1989), there are microeconomic benefits from adopting a
common currency like, for instance, savings in transaction costs. Alesina and Barro (2002) incorporate these
kinds of costs into a model and show that the desirability of currrency unions increases as the world number
of countries rises and the average country size falls. Yet, in their analysis the objectives of the policy makers
are ad hoc.
2See Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Benigno and Woodford (2005).
3See e.g. Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), Pappa (2004), Benigno and Benigno
(2003), Benigno and Benigno (2006), Benigno and Benigno (2008) and De Paoli (2009a).
4An exception in this respect is represented by Epifani and Gancia (2009). Within a multi-country open
economy framework, they show that the incentive of fiscal open economy authorities to manipulate the
terms of trade can explain the relationship between trade openness and the size of governments. However,
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small open economy model. This modeling choice seems more appropriate to study
the welfare gains of the creation of the EMU – including initially eleven countries –
and its enlargement. In our setting, the welfare gains of a currency area formed by
small open economies are generally larger than those of a monetary union formed by
big economies. Intuitively, when economies are small, policy makers take as given
what happens in the rest of the world, disregarding completely how their independent
policies jointly affect the global economy and the efficient use of world’s resources. By
contrast, policy makers of big economies internalize to a large extent the impact of
their decisions on the world aggregate outcomes.
The framework of our analysis is a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium open
economy model in which the world is split into two areas, called H and F . In each
area, there is a continuum of small open regions. Each region produces a bundle of
differentiated goods. Preferences exhibit home bias for goods produced within both
the region and the area. The trade elasticity is allowed to be different from one to nest
both the cases in which home and foreign bundles are substitutes and complements.
Results are always shown for different values of this elasticity, since this elasticity
plays a crucial role in determining the strength and the direction of the terms of trade
externality.5 Financial markets are complete, while labor is immobile across regions.
There is no capital. Prices are staggered, implying a cost for the adoption of a common
currency due to the impossibility to properly stabilize asymmetric shocks.
In this setup, we consider three different policy regimes (called A, B and C). Under
regime A, in area H exchange rates are flexible and each small open economy has its
own autonomous central bank; by contrast, in area F all regions share a common
currency and monetary policy is delegated to a single authority (e.g. FED). Under
regime B there is a single currency in each area and monetary policy is under the
control of two independent central banks (e.g. ECB and FED). Finally, under regime
C there is a common central bank for the world economy. Moreover, in all regimes
monetary policies are chosen under commitment and are optimal from the timeless
perspective.6
Both under regimes A and B optimal policies are biased by the desire of the mone-
tary authorities to affect the terms of trade in their favor.7 This incentive stems from a
free riding problem. Through the manipulation of their terms of trade, open economy
policy makers try to externalize labor effort at other countries’ expense. The direc-
tion of this externality – i.e., whether this incentive leads to the attempt to worsen
or to improve the domestic terms of trade – depends critically on the value of the
trade elasticity. If the trade elasticity is sufficiently low, domestic and foreign goods
are complements in the utility. Then, open economy authorities seek to worsen their
terms of trade and increase the home demand for both domestic and foreign produced
goods. In this way, domestic households can raise their consumption without reducing
leisure of the same amount – as it would happen in a closed economy – by virtue of the
foreign labor effort. Vice versa, if the trade elasticity is sufficiently large domestic and
foreign goods are substitutes in the utility. In this case, policy makers try to improve
their terms of trade to render foreign goods cheaper and to decrease the demand for
domestically produced goods. The reduction of the labor effort more than compensates
in the utility for the fall in consumption which is partially dampened by the rise in the
differently from us, they focus on the external effects of uncoordinated fiscal policies.
5For a discussion see Tille (2001), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002), Benigno and Benigno (2003) and Pappa
(2004).
6See Woodford (2003), Benigno and Woodford (2005) and Benigno and Woodford (2012).
7Notice that other policy instruments to affect terms of trade, such as tariffs, cannot be used in the WTO.
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domestic demand for the goods produced abroad – again this effect would be absent
in a closed economy.
These incentives are common to the policy makers of both large and small open
economies. However, the difference in size of these economies shapes their optimal
monetary conduct. In the limiting case in which the economy is small, the economic
performance of the small country is irrelevant for the behavior of the aggregate econ-
omy. As a consequence, from the small open economy’s point of view, strategically
manipulating the terms of trade exclusively has effects on domestic output, while leav-
ing the rest of the world unaffected. In equilibrium, however, the opposite will be true:
since the group of small open economies is large, aggregate distortions are substan-
tial. For instance, small open economy authorities do not realize that if they jointly
try to improve their terms of trade by reducing the demand for domestic goods, the
demand for goods of the foreign area increases, potentially amplifying the equilibrium
effects on their terms of trade. For this reason, they are more prone to adopt highly
inflationary policies that generate strong negative externalities. In contrast, when the
economy is big, even if they do not internalize the effects of their policies on other
countries’ welfare, policy makers take into account the impact of their decisions on the
world economy equilibrium. So they disagree on how much to produce and consume
individually and they try to manipulate their terms of trade by affecting domestic and
foreign outputs in opposite directions to allow domestic households to enjoy relatively
more leisure or consumption. Nevertheless, they take into account the feedback effects
of their policies stemming from the other area and they recognize the importance of
using efficiently the resources available in the world economy.
The differences in the conduct of monetary policies explain the differences in out-
comes across policy regimes. Under regime B, policy makers of areas H and F are
exactly symmetric. Both of them try to manipulate the terms of trade between areas.
Hence, being under regime C instead of regime B eliminates this externality. How-
ever, independently of the value of the trade elasticity, this welfare benefit is always
outweighed by the costs due to the impossibility of properly stabilizing area-specific
shocks in a monetary union. This result suggests that adopting a common currency for
two large economies like the U.S. and the eurozone is not desirable. Conversely, under
regime A, while the common central bank in area F seeks to manipulate the terms
of trade between areas, monetary policy makers of the small open economies try to
influence those between their region and the areas H and F. By so doing, they neither
internalize the spill-over effects within nor across areas. As a consequence, for values
of the trade elasticity above 1.8, there are welfare benefits – which can be substantial8
– for the households living in areas H and F not only from being under regime B
instead of A, but also from being under regime C instead of A. These findings help to
explain the process of the EMU formation and enlargement.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic setup, section 3 de-
termines the equilibrium, section 4 characterizes the Pareto efficient allocation, section
5 describes the welfare approximations, section 6 discusses the dynamic simulations
and section 7 reports the results of the welfare evaluation.
8Especially if compared with those found in previous studies on monetary policy coordination (e.g.
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002)) and in the business cycle literature (e.g. Lucas (1987) and Lucas (2003)).
4
2 The basic framework
The world consists of a continuum of small open regions indexed by i ∈ [0, 1].The
regions are split in two areas – H and F – of equal size. In area H, there is a continuum
of regions indexed by i ∈ [0, 12), which are independent countries. Area F consists of
regions indexed by i ∈ [12 , 1], which belong to a monetary union. In each region
i, households supply a continuum of imperfectly substitutable labor services, which
are immobile both across regions and areas. Each region produces a continuum of
imperfectly substitutable goods using all the labor services available in the domestic
economy. There is no capital. Moreover, there are complete financial markets and the
law of one price holds.
2.1 Preferences
Agents are infinitely lived and maximize the expected value of the discounted sum of
the per-period utility. Preferences of a generic household s of region i are defined over
a private consumption bundle, Cit , and labor service s, N
i
t (s):
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
Cit
1−σ
1− σ −
N it (s)
ϕ+1
ϕ+ 1
]
0 < β < 1 (1)
where β is the intertemporal preferences discount factor. Agents consume all the
goods produced in the world economy, but preferences exhibit home bias. The private
consumption index is a CES aggregation of the following type:
Cit ≡
[
α
1
η
s C
i
i,t
η−1
η + (αb − αs)
1
ηCiH,t
η−1
η + (1− αb)
1
ηCiF,t
η−1
η
] η
η−1
(2)
for all i ∈ [0, 12) η > 0, 0 < αs < αb and 12 < αb < 1. αs and αb are the degrees of home
bias for the goods produced within region i and the area to which region i belongs,
respectively. Hence, if αs = 1, the region becomes closed, whereas if it goes to zero,
the CES aggregation in (2) turns into that of a two-country model with home bias
and countries of equal size. Conversely, when αb = 1, the area is closed. In this case,
the small open regions are like the small open economy laid out in Gal´ı and Monacelli
(2005) and De Paoli (2009a) with the difference that the external world is framed as a
continuum of small open economies – as in Gal´ı and Monacelli (2009) – and not as a
closed country.
The parameter η denotes the elasticity of substitution between CiH,t, C
i
F,t and C
i
i,t,
which are defined as:
CiH,t ≡
[
2
1
η
∫ 1
2
0
Cij,t
η−1
η dj
] η
η−1
CiF,t ≡
[
2
1
η
∫ 1
1
2
Cij,t
η−1
η dj
] η
η−1
(3)
Cij,t ≡
(∫ 1
0
cit(h
j)
ε−1
ε dhj
) ε
ε−1
j ∈ [0, 1
2
) Cij,t ≡
(∫ 1
0
cit(f
j)
ε−1
ε df j
) ε
ε−1
j ∈ [1
2
, 1]
(4)
with ε being the elasticity of substitution among goods produced in the same region.
The definition of the private consumption index (2) enables us to determine a consistent
definition for the consumers’ price index of region i, given by:
PCi,t ≡
[
αsPi,t
1−η + (αb − αs)PH,t1−η + (1− αb)PF,t1−η
] 1
1−η (5)
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for all i ∈ [0, 12), where all prices are denominated in the currency of the home coun-
try. The variables Pi,t, PH,t and PF,t are producers’ price indexes that are defined
consistently with the other consumption indexes (3) and (4). The law of one price is
assumed to hold in all single-good markets. However, given the home bias in prefer-
ences, in general purchasing power parity does not hold for indexes PCi,t. Symmetric
definitions apply to the region of area F .
2.2 Consumption demand, portfolio choices and labor sup-
ply
The consumption and price index definitions allow to solve the consumer problem in
two stages. In the first stage, agents decide how much real net income to allocate to
goods produced at home and abroad, leading to the following demand functions:
Cii,t = αs
(
Pi,t
PCi,t
)−η
Cit C
i
H,t = (αb−αs)
(
PH,t
PCi,t
)−η
Cit C
i
F,t = (1−αb)
(
PF,t
PCi,t
)−η
Cit
(6)
for all i ∈ [0, 12) and j ∈ [0, 1]. Similarly, we can use (3) and (4) to retrieve consistent
demand function for Cij,t, c
i
t(h
j) and cit(f
j). In the second stage, agents maximize
(1) with respect to Cit , D
i
t+1 and N
i
t (s) subject to the following sequence of budget
constraints:
Et{Qit,t+1Dit+1} = Dit +Wi,t(s)N it (s)− PCi,tCit + T it (7)
N it (s) =
(
Wi,t(s)
Wi,t
)−υit
N it (8)
where Wi,t ≡
[∫ 1
0 Wi,t(s)
1−υitds
] 1
1−υit is the aggregate wage index of individual labor
services. Condition (7) is the budget constraint, which states that nominal saving, net
of lump sum transfers, has to equalize the nominal value of a state contingent portfo-
lio. Here Wi,t(s) stands for the per hour nominal wage, Q
i
t,t+1 denotes the stochastic
discount factor and Dit+1 is the payoff of a one-period-maturity portfolio of firm shares.
Constraint (8) is a consequence of a CES aggregation of labor inputs, which will be
specified below and states that the labor market is monopolistically competitive. In-
deed, each agent offers a different kind of labor service. Note that υit, the elasticity
of demand of labor is region-specific and time-varying as in Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler
(2002). Domestic and international markets are assumed to be complete.
The optimality conditions of the household’s problem imply:
(1 + µit)N
i
t (s)
ϕ
Cit
σ
=
Wi,t
PCi,t
(9)
β
(
Cit+1
Cit
)−σ (
PCi,t
PCi,t+1
)
= Qit,t+1 (10)
which hold in all states of nature and in all periods and where µit ≡ 1υit−1 . According
to (9), workers set the real wage as mark-up over the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure, while the value of the intertemporal marginal rate of
substitution of consumption equals the stochastic discount factor expressed in terms of
the currency of region i. Notice that since wages are perfectly flexible, N it (s)=N
i
t and
Wi,t(s)=Wi,t for all s and t. Moreover the wage mark-up, µ
i
t , is shocked exogenously,
entailing exogenous movements in the wedge between the real wage and the marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and leisure.
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2.3 Firms, technology and price setting
In each region i there is a continuum of firms. Each of them produces a single differ-
entiated good with a constant return to scale technology of the type:
yt(h
i) = AitNt(h
i) (11)
with Nt(h
i) =
[∫ 1
0 Nt(s, h
i)
υit−1
υit ds
] υit
υit−1
being labor input bundle, composed of a con-
tinuum of imperfectly substitutable labor services.9 Moreover, Ait is the region-specific
technology shock. Given (11) and the fact that Nt(s, h
i) = Nt(h
i) for all hi and s, the
aggregate relationship between output and labor can be written as:
N it =
Y it
Ait
Zit (12)
where Y it ≡
[∫ 1
0 yt(h
i)
ε−1
ε dhi
] ε
ε−1
, Zit ≡
∫ 1
0
yt(hi)
Y it
dhi and N it ≡
∫ 1
0 Nt(h
i)dhi. Using the
demand functions one can show that Zit =
∫ 1
0
(
pt(hi)
Pi,t
)−ε
dhi; thus Zit can be interpreted
as an index of the relative price dispersion or output dispersion across firms. We assume
that goods prices adjust according to a staggered mechanism a` la Calvo. Therefore,
in each period a given firm can re-optimize its price only with probability 1 − θ. As
a result, the fraction of firms that set a new price is fixed and the aggregate producer
price index of the intermediate goods evolves accordingly to:
P
(1−ε)
i,t = θP
(1−ε)
i,t−1 + (1− θ)p˜t(hi)
(1−ε)
(13)
with p˜t(h
i) being the optimal price. Firms maximize the discounted expected sum of
the future profits that would be collected if the optimal price could not be changed.
∞∑
s=0
(θ)sEt
{
Qit,t+syt+s(h
i)
[
p˜t(h
i)−MCni,t+s
]}
(14)
where yt(h
i) =
(
pt(hi)
Pi,t
)−ε
Y it and MC
n
i,t =
(1−τ i)Wi,t
Ait
is the nominal marginal cost with
τ i denoting a constant labor subsidy. Taking into account (10) and that MCi,t ≡ MC
n
i,t
Pi,t
,
the optimality condition of the firm problem can be written as:
∞∑
s=0
(βθ)sEt
{
Cit+s
−σ
(
p˜t(h
i)
Pi,t+s
)−ε
Y it+s
Pi,t
PCi,t+s
[
p˜t(h
i)
Pi,t
− ε
ε− 1
Pi,t+s
Pi,t
MCi,t+s
]}
= 0
(15)
Condition (15) states implicitly that firms reset their prices as a mark-up over a
weighted average of the current and expected marginal costs, where the weight of
the expected marginal cost at some date t + s depends on the probability that the
price is still effective at that date.
9By assumption, therefore, every household works in all firms.
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3 Equilibrium
3.1 International risk sharing
The assumption of complete markets implies:
Cit
−σ
PCi,t
=
Cjt
−σ
Eij,tPCj ,t
(16)
for all t, i ∈ [0, 12) and j ∈ (12 , 1], where Eij,t denotes the nominal exchange rate
of region j currency relative to region i currency. According to (16), the values of
marginal utilities of consumption are equal across regions. However, given the home
bias in consumption, even if the law of one price holds, purchasing power parity does
not. As a consequence, consumption can be different both across regions and areas.
By appropriately integrating this equation we obtain:
Cit
−σ
PCi,t
=
C∗H,t
−σ
EiH,tP ∗H,t
i ∈ [0, 1
2
)
Cit
−σ
PCi,t
=
C∗F,t
−σ
EiF,tP ∗F,t
i ∈ (1
2
, 1]
C∗H,t
−σ
P ∗H,t
=
C∗F,t
−σ
EHF,tP ∗F,t
(17)
for all i, where C∗H,t ≡
[
2
∫ 1
2
0 C
j
t
−σ(1−η)
dj
] −1
σ(1−η)
and P ∗H,t ≡
[
2
∫ 1
2
0
(EHj,tPCj ,t)(1−η) dj] 1(1−η) .
Symmetric definitions apply to C∗F,t and P
∗
F,t.
Here EHi,t stands for the nominal exchange rate of region i currency to a common
unit of account of area H. Regarding conditions (17), notice the following. Within
area F , there is always a common currency, independently of the policy regime. Thus,
EFi,t = 1 for all i ∈ [12 , 1]. Conversely within area H, EHi,t = 1 for all i ∈ [0, 12) only
under regimes B and C, when there is a common currency and the exchange rates are
fixed. Finally, in general, EHF,t is floating under both regimes A and B while is fixed
to 1 under regime C.
As shown in Appendix A, it follows from (16) and (17) that:
Pi,t
PCi,t
=
[
γs + (γb − γs)
(
C∗H,t
Cit
)−σ(1−η)
+ (1− γb)
(
C∗F,t
Cit
)−σ(1−η)] 11−η
(18)
for i ∈ [0, 12) and where γs ≡ 1αs and γb ≡
αb
2αb−1 . A corresponding condition can be
retrieved for area F . At the same time, the price index (5) can be log-linearized as:
pˆi,t − pˆic,t = − (αb − αs) sˆiH,t − (1− αb) sˆiF,t i ∈ [0,
1
2
) (19)
where sˆiH,t ≡ eiH,t + pˆH,t − pˆi,t and sˆiF,t ≡ eiF,t + pˆF,t − pˆi,t denote the terms of
trade between the small open region i and areas H and F respectively10 and where
cˆH,t ≡ 2
∫ 1
2
0 cˆ
j
tdj and cˆF,t ≡ 2
∫ 1
1
2
cˆjtdj.
11
10...namely the average price of the goods produced in areas H or F relative to the average price of the
goods produced in the small open economy i. With a notational abuse pˆF,t indicates the log-deviation of
the average price in area F expressed in terms of the common currency of that area. Similar interpretation
applies to pˆH,t.
11We will use this as a general notation. For a given variable Xjt , xˆ
j
t ≡ logXjt − logXj is the log-deviation
of Xjt from the steady state, while xˆH,t ≡ 2
∫ 1
2
0
xˆjtdj and xˆF,t ≡ 2
∫ 1
1
2
xˆjtdj are the average area log-deviation
from the steady state.
8
By combining (5) with (19) and using (17) we obtain:
sˆiH,t = −σγs(cˆH,t − cˆit) sˆiF,t = −σγs(cˆH,t − cˆit)− σ(2γb − 1)(cˆF,t − cˆH,t) (20)
for all i ∈ [0, 12). Moreover, by integrating the log-linear approximation of (18) and
(19), it is easy to show that:
sˆHF,t = −σ(2γb − 1)(cˆF,t − cˆH,t) (21)
where sˆHF,t ≡ eˆHF,t + pˆF,t − pˆH,t is the terms of trade between area F and area H.
According to (21), in equilibrium a rise in the terms of trade at home reduces its
relative consumption ratio since, as previously assumed, αb >
1
2 and thus γb >
1
2 .
A terms-of-trade worsening (i.e., an increase of sˆHF,t) induces home consumers to
substitute goods produced in area F with goods produced in area H and increases their
overall consumption because given the home bias in consumption they prefer relatively
more the bundle produced in their own area. Notice that the impact of a terms-of-
trade deterioration on consumption differentials depends critically on households’ risk
aversion (or the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption)
σ. The higher σ is, the lower is the difference in average consumption across areas
associated with a given movement in the terms of trade. More risk adverse households
are more willing to share risk across different states of the world (or more willing to
smooth consumption across periods). Similarly, the lower the degree of home bias αb
is, the more movements in the terms of trade translate into consumption differentials,
implying that more open areas are more sensitive to changes in the terms of trade.
Finally, by taking differences of (20) and (21), it follows that:
∆eiH,t + piH,t − pii,t = −σγs(∆cˆH,t −∆cˆit) i ∈ [0,
1
2
) (22)
piF,t − pii,t = −σγs(∆cˆF,t −∆cˆit) i ∈ [
1
2
, 1] (23)
∆eHF,t + piF,t − piH,t = −σ(2γb − 1)(∆cˆF,t −∆cˆH,t) (24)
Equation (23) – and under regimes B and C, when eiH,t = 1 and eHF,t = 1, also
equations (22) and (24) – can be interpreted as a constraint imposed by the adoption
of a common currency according to which, in response to asymmetric shocks, the terms
of trade cannot adjust instantaneously because of the sluggish price adjustment and the
fixed exchange rates. Differently, under regime A in area H, when there is monetary
autonomy, the fluctuations of the nominal exchange rate assure that condition (22) is
always satisfied.
3.2 IS curves
Condition (10) implies that:
1
1 + rit
= βEt
{(
Cit+1
Cit
)−σ
Π−1
Ci,t+1
}
(25)
for all i, where 11+ri,t = Et{Qit,t+1}. When markets are complete, the expected
value of the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of private consumption, namely
the price of a riskless portfolio, equalizes the price of the riskless bond, being ri,t the
nominal interest rate. Notice that under regime A, rit can be different across the regions
in area H, since national central banks are independent in their policy decisions, while
9
rit = rF,t for all i ∈ [12 , 1] with rF,t being the nominal interest of area F set by the
common central bank of the monetary union. Conversely, under regime B, rit = rH,t
for all i ∈ [0, 12), rit = rF,t for all i ∈ [12 , 1]. Finally, under regime C rit = rW,t for all i.
By using (17), we can log-linearize (25) and rewrite it as:
rF,t − ρ− Et{piF,t+1} =σEt{∆cˆF,t+1 + (1− γb)(∆cˆH,t+1 −∆cˆF,t+1)} (26)
rit − ρ− Et{pii,t+1} =σEt{∆cˆit+1 + (γb − γs)(∆cˆH,t+1 −∆cˆit+1)
+ (1− γb)(∆cˆF,t+1 −∆cˆit+1)} (27)
rH,t − ρ− Et{piH,t+1} =σEt{∆cˆH,t+1 + (1− γb)(∆cˆF,t+1 −∆cˆH,t+1)} (28)
where ρ ≡ −log(β). Conditions (26), (27) and (28) are the so called IS-curves. Condi-
tion (26) holds under regimes A and B, condition (27) under regime A and condition
(28) under regime B.
3.3 Aggregate demand
In each region i of area H the demand for a specific good, yt(h
i), is determined by the
demand of home and foreign consumers, namely:
yt(h
i) = cit(h
i) +
∫ 1
2
0
cjt (h
i)dj +
∫ 1
1
2
cjt (h
i)dj (29)
for all i ∈ [0, 12) and where cjt (hi) is the foreign demand for the good hi. Given (6),
from condition (29) we can find the aggregate demand for region i:
Y it = αs
(
Pi,t
PCi,t
)−η
Ct+2(αb−αs)
∫ 1
2
0
(
Pi,t
PCj ,t
)−η
Cjt dj+2(1−αb)
∫ 1
1
2
(
Pi,t
PCj ,t
)−η
Cjt dj
(30)
with Y it ≡
[∫ 1
0 yt(h
i)
ε−1
ε dhi
] ε
ε−1
. Because of (16), (30) can be written as:
Y it =
(
Pi,t
PCi,t
)−η [
αsC
i
t + (αb − αs)CitσηCH,t + (1− αb)CitσηCF,t
]
(31)
with CH,t ≡ 2
∫ 1
2
0 C
j
t
1−ση
dj and CF,t ≡ 2
∫ 1
1
2
Cjt
1−ση
dj for all i ∈ [0, 12). A symmet-
ric condition can be stated for all i ∈ [12 , 1]. It is easy to show that the log-linear
approximation to (31) corresponds to:
yˆit = δscˆ
i
t + (δb − δs)cˆH,t + (1− δb)cˆF,t i ∈ [0,
1
2
) (32)
where δs ≡ γsησ + αs(1 − ησ) and δb ≡ γbησ + αb(1 − ησ). Notice that δs can be
interpreted as the elasticity of region i output to region i consumption. By using (20)
and (21), we can rewrite (32) as:
yˆit = cˆ
i
t +
[
1− δb
σ(2γb − 1) −
1− δs
σγs
]
sˆiH,t − 1− δb
σ(2γb − 1) sˆiF,t (33)
Thus, the fluctuations in the aggregate demand for region i produced goods depend
crucially on the terms-of-trade movements. Aggregating (33), we obtain:
yˆH,t = cˆH,t − 1− δb
σ(2γb − 1) sˆHF,t (34)
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According to (34), when δb = 1 area H aggregate consumption and output perfectly
co-move one to one as if the area were closed. Conversely, if δb > 1 (δb < 1), in response
to a terms of trade improvement (worsening) between area H and F output in area H
falls (rises). An intuition of this result is provided in Section 5.1.
3.4 Aggregate supply
Following Benigno and Woodford (2005), we can rewrite the firms’ optimality condi-
tions, (13) and (15), recursively as follows:
1− θΠε−1i,t
1− θ =
(
F it
Kit
)ε−1
(35)
Zit = θZ
i
t−1Π
ε
i,t + (1− θ)
(
1− θΠε−1i,t
1− θ
) ε
ε−1
(36)
where:
Kit = C
i
t
−σ
Y ii,t
Pi,t
PCi,t
ε
ε− 1MCi,t + βθEt
{
Πεi,t+1K
i
t+1
}
(37)
F it = C
i
t
−σ
Y it
Pi,t
PCi,t
+ βθEt
{
Πε−1i,t+1F
i
t+1
}
(38)
with Πi,t ≡ Pi,tPi,t−1 and
Kit
F it
= p˜t(h
i)
Pi,t
. By the log-linear approximation of (35), (37) and
(38):
pii,t = λm̂ci,t + βEt{pii,t+1} (39)
with λ ≡ (1−θ)(1−βθ)θ and where m̂ci,t =
(
wˆit − pˆic,t
) − (pˆi,t − pˆic,t) − aˆit for all t and
i. Condition (39) is the New Keynesian Phillips Curve, which results from the Calvo
mechanism. As usual, current domestic inflation depends on the expectation on future
domestic inflation and the current real marginal cost of producing goods. In equilibrium
this cost is determined by the real wage, which – according to (9) – is a mark-up over the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure, the product price index
relative to the consumption price index (18) and labor productivity. By substituting
the log-linear approximation of (9) and condition (19) into m̂ci,t we obtain:
m̂ci,t = ϕyˆ
i
t + σcˆ
i
t + (αb − αs)sˆiH,t + (1− αb)sˆiF,t − (1 + ϕ)aˆit + µˆit
= (ϕ+ σ)yˆit +
[
γs − δs
γs
− γb − δb
2γb − 1
]
sˆiH,t +
γb − δb
2γb − 1 sˆiF,t − (1 + ϕ)aˆ
i
t + µˆ
i
t (40)
for all i ∈ [0, 12) where the last equality can be recovered by using (33). According to
the second equation in (40) – and as discussed in more detail below in Sections 4, 5.1
and 5.3 – in general firms’ marginal cost is influenced by terms-of-trade fluctuations.
However, when ησ = 1, the firms’ marginal cost of small open regions is completely
insulated from terms-of-trade movements and becomes isomorphic to that of a closed
economy. In fact, under this parametric configuration δs − γs = (γs − αs)(ησ − 1) = 0
and δb − γb = (γb − αb)(ησ − 1) = 0.
The rational-expectations equilibrium can be determined using (9), (17), (18), (25),
(31), (35), (36), (37), (38) and their foreign counterparts. To close the model, it remains
to determine the optimal monetary policies under regimes A, B and C.
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4 The Pareto-efficient allocation
In Appendix B we retrieve the conditions that characterize the Pareto-efficient allo-
cation. As common in the New-Keynesian literature, in this model in the absence
of mark-up shocks, the efficient allocation can be supported as a market equilibrium
under the following conditions: First, the steady-state distortion due to monopolistic
competition is corrected in all regions by the use of an appropriate labor subsidy; sec-
ond, the dynamic distortion caused by price and output dispersion is eliminated by
completely stabilizing firms’ marginal costs in all markets. While a formal derivation
of this result is beyond the scope of this paper, we will show how the second condition
applies to the average fluctuations in the areas. This will prove useful for the analysis
of the optimal policies to which we turn below. By combining the two conditions in
(73) with their symmetric counterparts for the foreign area, we obtain:
yˆeH,t =
(ϕ+ 1)
σ + ϕ
aˆH,t +
(δb − γb)σ(ϕ+ 1)
(σ + ϕ)((2γb − 1)σ + (2δb − 1)ϕ)(aˆH,t − aˆF,t) (41)
where the suffix e stands for efficient. Condition (41) expresses the percentage devia-
tions of the efficient level of output in area H in terms of area H productivity and the
productivity differentials between area H and F . At the same time, we can define
m̂ceH,t ≡ ϕyˆH,t + σcˆH,t + (1− αb)sˆHF,t − (1 + ϕ)aˆH,t (42)
as firms’ marginal cost in the absence of the mark-up shocks. A symmetric definition
applies to m̂ceF,t, the efficient firms’ marginal cost in area F . Then, stabilizing such
costs, i.e.,
m̂ceH,t = 0
m̂ceF,t = 0 (43)
ensures jointly with the equilibrium conditions (21), (34) and its foreign counterpart
that the average output fluctuations mimic those of the efficient allocation which are
determined by equation (41). Intuitively, when a technology shock occurs and the
firms’ marginal costs are held constant, the dynamic distortion due to price stickiness
is corrected and the average area fluctuations in the marginal rates of substitution and
transformation between consumption and labor are equal.
Regarding condition (41) recall that δb−γb = (γb−αb)(ησ−1). As a result, the sign
of the coefficient of productivity shock differentials depends critically on whether the
trade elasticity η is greater or smaller than the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
1/σ – i.e., on whether domestic and foreign goods are substitutes in the utility so that
an increase in the demand for foreign goods at home reduces the marginal utility from
consuming domestic goods. Therefore, the impact of a foreign productivity shock on
domestic output is determined by relative strength of two effects. The first effect is
an intertemporal effect: in response to an inprovement in the foreign productivity, the
foreign interest rate falls and – since σ ≥ 1 – foreign consumers increase their supply
of state-state contingent assets in order to smooth consumption across periods. As a
consequence, domestic households can borrow more. This effect is stronger, the higher
is σ. The second effect is an intratemporal effect: as productivity improves in the foreign
economy, domestic terms of trade amiliorate. Then, domestic and foreign households
shift the composition of their consumption bundle, reducing (raising) their demand
for domestic goods as long as η, the trade elasticity, is greater (smaller) than one.
Given these two effects, when ησ > 1 (substitutes in the utility), domestic households
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increase their borrowing and their leisure in response to a rise in foreign productivity,
while the improvement in the domestic terms of trade possibly contracts the demand
for domestically produced goods via the expenditure switching effect. Overall output
in area H falls. Vice versa, when ησ < 1 (complements in the utility), a positive
productivity shock in the foreign area raises domestic output. In this case, the demand
for domestically produced goods increases in response to the rise in the demand for
foreign goods despite the terms-of-trade improvement. Finally, if ησ = 1, output in
area H is insulated from foreign productivity shocks and the associated shifts in the
terms of trade and behaves as if the economy were closed.12 In this special case, as
made clear by condition (40), firms’ marginal costs are independent of terms-of-trade
fluctuations since the intertemporal and the intratemporal effects exactly offset each
other and there is no incentive for domestic households to change their consumption
and labor decisions in response to a technological improvement in the foreign economy.
5 Welfare
As anticipated in the introduction, the main objective of this paper is to compare
welfare costs and benefits of a monetary union in a fully micro-founded New-Keynesian
model under three policy regimes. Under regime A, there is a common currency in area
F , while countries in area H retain their own central banks; under regime B, there are
two monetary unions, one in area F and the other one in area H. Under regime C,
there is a single authority that sets the interest rate for the world economy as a whole.
In order to solve the optimal monetary policy problems, we make the following
assumptions. Independently of the policy regime all monetary authorities (the central
banks of the monetary unions and of the small open economies) are benevolent, take as
given other policy makers’ choices and can commit credibly to past and future promises.
In other words, policies are optimal from the timeless perspective. As in Benigno and
Benigno (2006), policy makers’ strategies of the policy game under regimes A and B are
specified in terms of the entire path of inflation,13 defined as a time-varying function
of the shocks hitting the economy.14 So when maximizing domestic utility at time 0,
these authorities commit credibly to implement the desired state-contingent path of
inflation, taking as given the state-contingent path of inflation chosen by foreign policy
makers.15
Under these hypotheses, we can use the linear-quadratic approach pioneered by
Benigno and Woodford (2005) and Benigno and Woodford (2012) to determine the op-
timal monetary policies.16 We implement the linear quadratic approach as follows.17
First, we formulate the non-linear optimal policy problems (Ramsey problems). Sec-
ond, we recover the zero-inflation deterministic steady state of these problems. Third,
we employ the second-order approximation of the structural equations to retrieve a
12These results are well known in the open-macro literature. See for a discussion Corsetti, Dedola and
Leduc (2010).
13The producer price inflation.
14Namely, we study the open-loop Nash equilibrium.
15Notice that given this assumption, under regime A, small open economy central banks take as given all
the aggregate variables. Intuitively, if the economy is infinitesimally small, its performance cannot influence
aggregate variables.
16Actually, it would be difficult to compute these policies using standard numerical methods, since the
economy is framed as a continuum of small open regions.
17For more specific details on the non-linear optimal policy problems, on the zero-inflation steady state
and on the quadratic approximation, see Appendices C and D.
13
purely quadratic approximation to the objectives of both the small open economy and
the monetary union authorities expressed as function of output, inflation and terms of
trade in deviations from their welfare-relevant targets. As emphasized below, identify-
ing these targets proves particularly useful to disentangle what drives policy makers’
incentives. Fourth, we determine the optimal monetary policies by maximizing these
quadratic approximations subject to the log-linear approximation of the structural con-
straints. Finally, we quantify welfare differences for the households of areas H and F
across policy regimes and we identify which regime is preferable depending on the deep
parameters of the model.
5.1 The steady-state distortion
We assume that τ , the employment subsidy, is equal across countries and regimes. As
shown in Appendix C, under this assumption, there exists a symmetric deterministic
steady state at which zero inflation is a Nash equilibrium policy for all policy makers
in areas H and F under both regimes A and B. Similarly, it can be shown that at the
deterministic steady state zero inflation is an optimal policy for the world monetary
policy maker under regime C.18
At the steady state the following condition holds:
Y = C = (1− τ˜)− 1σ+ϕ (44)
where τ˜ ≡ 1 − (1 − τ)(1 + µ) εε−1 . As made clear by (44), τ˜ determines the steady-
state wedge between the marginal rates of substitution and transformation between
consumption and leisure. Indeed, according to (44) (1 − τ˜)MRS = (1 − τ˜)CσY ϕ =
1 = MRT .
Given their different objectives, the policy makers of the small open economies and
of the monetary unions have different incentives and different ideas about what is the
efficient steady-state level of domestic output.
Consider first the case of a cooperative policy maker. In order to determine the
optimal level of domestic output from the world authority point of view we maximize:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[∫ 1
0
(
Cit
1−σ
1− σ −
1
ϕ+ 1
(
Y it
Ait
)ϕ+1)
di
]
(45)
with respect to Cit and Y
i
t for all i ∈ [0, 1], subject to (31) and its foreign counterpart
and taking into account that Pi,t/PCi,t are determined according to (18) and its foreign
analogue. Not surprisingly, at the deterministic steady state the cooperative policy
maker finds it optimal to choose τ˜ = 1− (1− τ))(1 + µ) εε−1 = 0 so that Yw = 1. With
this policy, she manages to implement the Pareto optimum, offsetting the monopolistic
distortions in both the labor and the goods markets and closing completely the wedge
between marginal rates of substitution and transformation. Then we can define:
Φw ≡ τ˜ (46)
as a parameter that governs the steady-state distortion from the world economy policy
maker viewpoint.
Consider now the case of the small open economy i. The efficient steady state from
the small open policy maker perspective can be retrieved by maximizing:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
Cit
1−σ
1− σ −
1
ϕ+ 1
(
Y it
Ait
)ϕ+1]
18See Benigno and Benigno (2006) for a formal proof of this result.
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f with respect to Cit and Y
i
t , subject to (31) and where Pi,t/PCi,t are determined
consistently with (18), while – differently from the case of cooperation – C∗H,t, C
∗
F,t, CH,t
and CF,t are taken as given. According to the first order conditions, at the symmetric
deterministic steady state:
Ys = δ
−1
σ+ϕ
s (47)
As above, δs ≡ γsησ + αs(1 − ησ). According to (44) and (47), the optimal labor
subsidy that decentralizes – at the steady state – the efficient allocation from the small
open economy viewpoint as a market equilibrium is given by τ˜s = 1− δs. Then, we can
define:
Φs ≡ τ˜ − τ˜s (48)
as a parameter that measures the steady-state distortion from the small open economy
perspective.
As made clear by (47), the small open economy policy makers do not aim to reach
the Pareto-efficient steady state at which the monopolistic distortions are exactly elim-
inated unless δs = 1. As long as δs > 1 (δs < 1), they would rather prefer a lower
(higher) level of steady-state production. Equations (32) and (33) provide an intu-
ition for this result. Consider first the case in which domestic and foreign goods are
substitutes in the utility (i.e., ησ > 1 and δs > 1 )
19 and the economy experiences a
terms-of-trade improvement. As the terms of trade ameliorates, consumers at home
borrow more (intertemporal effect), increase their leisure and possibly reduce the de-
mand for domestic goods (intratemporal effect). Domestic consumption falls relative
to foreign consumption. However, its fall is dampened by the rise in borrowing and in
the demand for goods produced abroad. Hence, domestic consumption decreases less
than output. As a consequence, small open economy authorities have an incentive to
try to improve the terms of trade: the rise in leisure due to the reduction in the labor
supply more than compensates households for the fall in consumption generated by
the terms-of-trade improvement. In other words, small open economies want to reduce
domestic production in order to improve the terms of trade and to externalize labor
effort at other countries’ expense. If αs1+αs < ησ < 1, δs is still greater than one. Intu-
itively, even if home and foreign goods are complements in the utility, consumers find
it optimal to borrow more. In this way, they can dampen the reduction of the overall
expenditure for consumption reducing at the same time their labor supply. Still, home
consumption falls less than output and small open economy policy makers will try to
improve their terms of trade. However, when ησ < αs1+αs , δs < 1 and home and foreign
goods are strong complements, this incentive turns around. Small country authorities
seek to worsen their terms of trade. In this case, the demand for both home and foreign
goods increase, as the terms of trade deteriorate. Then, a rise in one unit in domes-
tic production allows to raise home consumption by more than a unit thanks to the
increase in foreign labor supply. As a result, the increase in consumption more than
outweighs the reduction in leisure due to the terms-of-trade worsening in the utility.
Finally, if δs = 1, Φs = Φw and the steady-state level of output efficient from the small
open economy viewpoint coincides with the Pareto-efficient level i.e., Ys = Yw.
In the case of the policy maker of the monetary union, the desired level of steady-
state output can be determined by maximizing:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
2
∫ 1
2
0
(
Cit
1−σ
1− σ −
1
ϕ+ 1
(
Y it
Ait
)ϕ+1)
di
]
(49)
19Notice that δs > 1 as long as ησ > 1.
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with respect to Cit and Y
i
t for all i ∈ [0, 1] and subject to:
Pi,t
PCi,t
=
(1− τ˜)
Ait
ϕ+1
Y it
ϕ
Cit
−σ (50)
for all i ∈ [12 , 1], constraint (31) and its foreign counterpart.20 Again Pi,t/PCi,t is de-
termined according to (18) and its foreign counterpart. From the first-order conditions
of this problem it follows that at the symmetric deterministic steady state:
Yb =
[
1− (1− δb)(σ + ϕ)
(δbϕ+ γbσ)
] −1
σ+ϕ
(51)
This allocation can be achieved as market equilibrium by choosing a labor subsidy of
τ˜b =
(1−δb)(σ+ϕ)
(δbϕ+γbσ)
where δb ≡ γbησ + αb(1− ησ). At the same time, we can define:
Φb ≡ τ˜ − τ˜b (52)
as the analogue of the parameters Φw and Φs for the case of the big economy. According
to (51), even in the case of the big economy, policy makers seek to manipulate the
terms of trade to their own advantage. But differently from the case of the small open
economy, the key parameter that governs this incentive is 1−δb. If δb > 1, policy makers
of the big economies would like to under-subsidize labor, to improve the terms of trade
and reduce domestic production with respect to what would be Pareto efficient. Vice
versa, if δb < 1 and home and foreign goods are complements, the policy authorities
of the area try to over-subsidize domestic production to worsen the terms of trade. In
either case, they seek to externalize labor effort at other countries’ expense. Again
when δb = 1 there is no incentive to manipulate the terms of trade. Thus, in this case
domestic output is distorted from the big economy viewpoint only when the steady
state is not Pareto efficient, i.e., Yb 6= Yw.
Finally, Figure 1 plots the desired level of domestic output21 for the three cases
considered above as a function of η, – the trade elasticity – and using the baseline
parametrization: i.e., αs = 0.6, αb = 0.85 σ = 2 and ϕ = 3.
22 The violet line with
triangles shows the level of steady-state output under the baseline parametrization.
For most of the values of η policy makers of both small and big economies want
to under-subsidize labor to improve their terms of trade. However, this incentive is
significantly stronger for the small open economy policy makers. For instance, when
η = 2, Yb and Ys are respectively 11.5% and 27.13% lower than Yw, the Pareto efficient
level of output. The reasons for this outcome are threefold. First of all, bigger countries
are less open. As a consequence, the incentive of their policy makers to improve the
terms of trade is weaker. Secondly, big economy authorities realize that they hold
monopoly power only on the terms of trade between areas and they internalize the
external effects produced within the monetary union. Finally, they take into account
the impact of their policies on the foreign economy. For example, they are aware that
when δb > 1 a terms-of-trade improvement can raise foreign production in response to
the increase in the demand for foreign produced goods due to the expenditure-switching
20Condition (50) implicitly states that the policy maker of area H takes as given the strategy τ˜ chosen by
a symmetric policy maker in area F . Notice that in the case of the two areas and differently from the case
of the small open economy, in general, a steady state that is efficient from the viewpoint of both the policy
makers of the areas F and H and which is akin to the Pareto efficient steady state in a closed economy does
not exist.
21We could have alternatively shown the level of the desired subsidies.
22For a detailed discussion of the baseline calibration see section 6.
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effect. So they recognize that a lower labor tax rate (lower than the one set by the
small open economy policy makers, who take as given what happens in the foreign
economies) allows to reach the same terms-of-trade improvement. All these motives
contribute to the weakening of the desire to influence the terms of trade.
Summing up, the difference in size between small and big countries affects the in-
centives of their policy makers to generate externalities at the steady state. Specifically,
under the baseline parametrization, for almost all the values of the trade elasticity, the
desired steady-state level of domestic output is closer to Pareto efficiency in the case
of the monetary union than in the case of small open economies. As it will become
evident in the next sections, the fact that open economy policy makers have different
”perceptions” of the steady-state distortions is key to explain the differences in their
optimal policies over the business cycle. Indeed as we will clarify below, if the steady
state is distorted from the policy maker’s perspective (i.e., if steady state output does
not coincide with the desired level) then, monetary policy makers seek to manipulate
household and firm behavior over the business cycle in order to drive what we call the
per period output and the per period terms of trade (i.e., the expected level of output
and of the terms of trade) towards their desired levels.
5.2 The benchmark: the case of cooperation
In this section we consider the benchmark case of cooperation. In this scenario there
is a common authority that maximizes world welfare.23 In Appendix D.4, we show
that the objective of the cooperative policy maker can be approximated in a purely
quadratic way as follows:
1
1− τ˜
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[1
2
$1,w
∫ 1
0
(yˆit)
2di+$2,w
∫ 1
0
cˆityˆ
i
tdi+
1
2
$3,w
∫ 1
0
(cˆit)
2di
+
1
2
$4,w
∫ 1
0
(pii,t)
2di+
1
2
$5,w (yˆH,tcˆH,t + yˆF,tcˆF,t) +
1
4
$6,w
(
cˆ2H,t + cˆ
2
F,t
)
+
1
2
$7,w (yˆF,tcˆH,t + yˆH,tcˆF,t) +
1
2
$8,w cˆH,tcˆF,t −$9,w
∫ 1
0
yˆitaˆ
i
tdi
−$10,w
∫ 1
0
yˆitµˆ
i
tdi
]
+ t.i.p. (53)
where $1,w, $2,w, $3,w, $4,w, $5,w $6,w, $7,w, $8,w, $9,w and $10,w are defined
consistently with (128) and depend on the structural parameters of the model and
where t.i.p. stands for ”terms independent of policies”. The second-order welfare
approximation in (53) expresses the utility losses as a function of inflation, consumption
and output of the single regions and of the areas H and F . We want to rewrite (53) in
deviations from what the literature calls policy targets. In order to do so, we minimize
(53) subject to (32) and its foreign counterpart for all i ∈ [0, 1].24 The first-order
conditions of this minimization problem allow to retrieve the target of the cooperative
policy maker in our model. The policy target can then be interpreted as the allocation
that a policy maker would choose, taking into account the steady-state distortion due
23This approximation to the welfare will then be used to retrieve the objective of the central bank of the
world monetary union in regime C.
24Note that this is exactly the same as substituting these constrains into (53), as done by Benigno and
Woodford (2005).
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to monopolistic competition – or a distortive labor subsidy –, but abstracting from the
dynamic distortion generated by the firm price dispersion. For this reason, as shown
below, the analytical expression of these targets helps to disentangle what drives policy
maker incentives.
In the case of cooperation, the target of the cooperative authority satisfies the
following conditions:25
[1− ζw(ϕ+ 1)] m̂ce,wH,t = ζw(ϕ+ 1)µˆH,t
[1− ζw(ϕ+ 1)] m̂ce,wF,t = ζw(ϕ+ 1)µˆF,t (55)
where we used the convention that xˆwt is the target of the world policy maker for the
variable xˆt, while m̂c
e,w
H,t and m̂c
e,w
F,t are defined consistently with (42). From (55), we
draw the following conclusions about the goals of the cooperative authority:26
1. The trade-off. The cooperative monetary policy maker faces a trade-off between:
a) stabilizing completely the firms’ marginal costs at their efficient level (i.e.,
m̂ce,wH,t = 0 and m̂c
e,w
F,t = 0), b) allowing m̂c
e,w
H,t and m̂c
e,w
F,t to fluctuate in response
to mark-up shocks.
2. The weights of the trade-off and the steady-state distortion. The coefficients 1−
ζw(ϕ+ 1) and ζw(ϕ+ 1) correspond to the relative weights attached to the trade-
off and depend critically on the Φw, the parameter that governs the steady-state
distortion. In fact, since ζw =
Φw
(σ+ϕ) , ζw = 0 if and only if Φw = 0. As a result,
if the steady state is Pareto efficient (i.e., Φw = 0) completely stabilizing firms’
marginal costs at their efficient level is the target of the monetary policy maker.
In this case, we go back to the standard finding of closed economy literature27
stating that the central bank aims to close the gap between the marginal rates
of substitution and transformation between consumption and labor and to reach
the first-best allocation.
3. The cases for price stability. Independently of whether the steady state is dis-
torted or not, if shocks are only to technology, strict-inflation targeting is optimal.
Intuitively, even when Φw 6= 0, the monetary policy maker does not try to cor-
rect – not even partially – the steady-state distortions because the welfare gains
derived from the improvement of per period output towards efficiency are exactly
offset by the costs associated with firms’ output dispersion. Therefore, she ab-
stracts from the steady-state distortion and seeks to replicate the fluctuations of
the first-best allocation. In other words, under technological shocks the flexible-
price allocation is constrained efficient.
4. Mark-up shocks. Under mark-up shocks the monetary authority is willing to allow
m̂ce,wH,t and m̂c
e,w
F,t to fluctuate over the cycle to the extent to which the steady state
is distorted. In particular, if the per period output is inefficiently low – if i.e.,
25See condition (132) in Appendix D.4 for the full set of equations that determine the target of the
cooperative policy maker. For the sake of simplicity, we limit the discussion of the target of the cooperative
authority to the average-area variables. However, it can be shown that similar conditions hold for single
regions:
[1− ζw(ϕ+ 1)] m̂ce,wi,t = ζw(ϕ+ 1)µˆit (54)
26Most of these conclusions are the same as those of Benigno and Benigno (2006).
27See among others Gal´ı (2008) and Woodford (2003). On the open economy case, see Benigno and
Benigno (2006).
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Φw < 0 –, the monetary policy maker wants output to negatively co-move with
mark-up shocks. As a result, she under-stabilizes output – i.e., she stabilizes it
less than what she would do if the steady state were efficient. Put differently,
the cooperative authority changes her inflation output stabilization trade-off and
stabilizes inflation more than output. The stronger this incentive, the higher Φw
is, the latter being the parameter that governs the average wedge between the
marginal rates of substitution and transformation at the steady state.
At first, the third result is quite puzzling: mark-up shocks generate inefficient fluctu-
ations in consumption and output. Intuitively, we could expect that the central bank
then aims to completely stabilize output and consumption (as in fact it is willing to do
so when the steady state is efficient). Instead, it wants output and consumption to co-
move with these shocks. The underlying reason of this behavior can be understood by
looking at condition (100) in its closed economy counterpart. When prices are flexible
and there are no shocks to technology then:
E
{
Wt
Pt
}
= E
{
Y ϕ+σt
}
E {(1 + µt)}+ Cov
{
Y ϕ+σt (1 + µt)
}
(56)
According to (56), the lower the covariance between mark-up shocks and output, the
lower is the per period output for a given level of per period real wage. Then, condi-
tion (56) can explain the incentive of cooperative authorities (as well as of the closed
economy policy maker) to affect the risk of output fluctuations. These authorities can
try to manipulate strategically the effects of uncertainty on households behavior. In-
tuitively, policies can provide better – or worse – insurance against the risk of output
fluctuations due to mark-up shocks. For instance, when policies are less expansionary
in response to mark-up shocks, output fluctuates more. Then, households, who are
risk averse, would like to save more and raise their wealth stored to face bad states
of the world.28 For this reason, given the per period real wage an increase in the risk
of output fluctuations in response to mark-up shocks – i.e., a fall in the covariance
between mark-up shock and output – induces households to raise their average labor
effort. As a consequence, if per period output is inefficiently low, policies that increase
the negative co-movements between output and mark-up shocks have beneficial welfare
effects: they shift the average labor supply curve downward, allowing for an efficient
increase in the expected level of production. By using (20), (21) and (131), we can
rewrite (53) in terms of deviations from the target:
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]
+ t.i.p. (57)
where $11,w, $12,w and $13,w are defined in (135) and where we use the convention
by which x˜wt ≡ xˆt − xˆwt . Consistently with the open macro literature,29 the welfare
loss in (57) is expressed as a function of regional inflations, and gaps of area-specific
output and of terms of trade between areas and between regions and areas. Inflation
28Condition (56) can be interpreted alternatively as follows. As the covariance between mark-up shocks
rises, labor and labor income become lower in those states of world in which consumption is low. In other
words, labor becomes a worse hedge against bad states of the world. Hence, the expected level of the price
of labor (i.e., of the real wage) decreases.
29See for instance Benigno and Benigno (2006) and Corsetti et al. (2010).
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and terms of trade account for the inefficient dispersion of output across firms and
across regions and areas respectively. Finally, we use (57) to recover the objective of
the monetary policy maker of the world currency area under regime C, to formulate
her optimal policy problem and to retrieve the associated first-order conditions (see
conditions (136), (138) and (139) respectively).
5.3 The case of the small open economy
As shown in Appendix D.2, the objective of the small open economy policy maker of
country i in area H can be approximated up to the second order as:
1
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βtE0
[1
2
$1,s(yˆ
i
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2 +$2,scˆ
i
tyˆ
i
t +
1
2
$3,s(cˆ
i
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2 +
1
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$4,s(pii,t)
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−$6,syˆit cˆF,t −$7,scˆitcˆH,t −$8,scˆitcˆF,t −$9,syˆitaˆit −$10,syˆitµˆit
]
+ t.o.c. (58)
for all i ∈ [0, 12) and where $1,s, $2,s, $3,s, $4,s, $5,s, $6,s, $7,s, $8,s, $9,s and $10,s
are functions of the underlying parameters of the model as shown in (88). In addition,
t.o.c. stands for ”terms out of the control” of the policy makers and include – beside the
terms independent of monetary policy – the aggregate variables of both areas H and
F . As for the case of cooperation, we want to write the second-order approximation
in (58) in deviations from the policy target of the small open policy makers. To this
end, we minimize (58) subject to (32). According to the first-order conditions of this
problem, the policy target of the small open country authorities satisfies the following
condition:30
[1− ζs(ϕ+ 1)]m̂ce,si,t = ζs(ϕ+ 1)µˆit + κsH sˆsiH,t + κsF sˆsiF,t (59)
where xˆst indicates the target of the small open economy authority for the variable xˆ
i
t,
m̂ce,si,t is the efficient level of firms’ marginal cost in country i, defined as the small open
economy counterpart of (42) and the parameters of the model κsH and κ
s
F are specified
in (94). Comparing (59) with their analogue for the cooperative case, namely (54),
allows to stress the following findings:
1. The trade-off. The small open economy policy maker faces a trade-off between:
a) stabilizing firms’ marginal cost at its efficient level, b) affecting the covariance
between output and mark-up shocks to drive the per period terms of trade towards
its efficient level, c) manipulating the terms of trade that are relevant from small
open economy’s viewpoint over the cycle. The relative strength of these three
incentives depends critically on the coefficients [1− ζs(ϕ+ 1)], ζs(ϕ+ 1) and both
κsH and κ
s
F respectively.
2. The weights of the trade-off and the steady-state distortion. As was discussed
for the cooperative case, ζs is determined by Φs, the parameter that determines
the steady-state distortion from the perspective of the policy makers of the small
regions. In fact ζs =
Φs
δsϕ+γsσ
. Then, ζs = 0 if and only if Φs = 0, i.e., the
steady state is efficient from the viewpoint of the small open economy. However,
differently from the cooperative case, even when Φs = 0 stabilizing marginal cost
fluctuations at their efficient level is not the target of regional authorities: they
still trade off between this incentive and the desire to influence terms of trade
30See condition (93) in Appendix D.2 for the full set of equations that determine the target of the small
open economy.
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volatility to their own advantage. As a result, in general, strict inflation targeting
cannot be optimal even when shocks are only to technology and the steady state
is not distorted from the small open economy’s perspective.
3. The case for price stability. Under the parametric restriction ησ = 1, it follows
that κsH=κ
s
F=0 and the target of the small open economy policy makers in the
presence of technological shocks turns out to replicate the flexible-price alloca-
tion. This finding is independent of whether the steady-state distortion has been
eliminated by an appropriate labor subsidy (i.e., independent of whether Φs = 0)
and is consistent with the conclusions of the previous literature (see Benigno and
Benigno (2003), Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005) and De Paoli (2009a)). Intuitively,
when ησ = 1, domestic output fluctuations are independent of the terms of trade
since the intertemporal and the intratemporal effects exactly compensate and the
terms of trade movements do not induce domestic households to change their con-
sumption and their labor decisions. Then, the policy makers of the small open
economies anticipate that they cannot affect aggregate households’ decisions by
using the terms of trade over the cycle strategically.
4. Mark-up shocks. As in the case of cooperation, the target of the small open
economy authorities reacts to domestic mark-up shocks if and only if the steady
state is inefficient from the small open economy perspective (i.e., Φs 6= 0). In
particular, suppose that the small open region policy maker has an incentive to
improve their per period terms of trade (i.e., Φs > 0 ). Then, she can affect the
covariance between output and mark-up shocks. The mechanism works exactly
as in the case of the cooperative policy maker. By stabilizing output more than
inflation31 in response to mark-up shocks, small country authorities can induce
domestic households to lower their per period labor effort. As a result, per period
domestic output – which is perceived as too low – can fall, improving the terms
of trade.
5. The terms-of-trade volatility. When ησ 6= 1, it follows that κsH 6= 0 and κsF 6= 0.
In other words, if ησ 6= 1, independently of whether the steady state is efficient
from the small open economy viewpoint, policy makers of the small open countries
are influenced by the desire of manipulating the terms of trade over the cycle.
Notice that since κsH and κ
s
F depend critically on Φs, policy makers of the small
open economies use the manipulation of the terms-of-trade volatility also to drive
the expected levels of the terms of trade and output towards the desired levels.
According to Point (5), the reason that explains the incentive of the small region
authorities to manipulate terms-of-trade volatility is twofold. First, by affecting the
volatility of their terms of trade, small open country authorities can try to externalize
part of the cost of business cycle fluctuations at expenses of other countries. To give a
specific example let us assume that area H is closed (i.e., αb = 1 and κ
s
F = 0). In this
case, it can be shown that, as long as Φs = 0 and ησ > 1, it follows that κ
s
H < 0.
32
Hence, under this parametric configuration, small open economy policy makers seek to
under-stabilize firms’ marginal costs in response to productivity shocks (see condition
(59)). For instance, following an improvement in domestic technology they worsen
their terms of trade less than needed to keep firms’ marginal costs constant – as the
cooperative policy maker would do. Dampening the terms-of-trade movements reduces
31as long as δsϕ+γsσϕ+1 > δs − (1− τ˜).
32The case αb < 1 is more complicated. Still whether ησ is great er or smaller than 1 is crucial in
determining the sign of κsH and κ
s
F .
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the shifts of state-contingent assets and the possible expenditure-switching effects of
the households’ demand from foreign to domestic goods. In this way, the volatilities of
consumption and output and their associated welfare costs can decrease.33
Second, small open economy policy makers attempt to manipulate the terms-of-
trade volatility to drive per period domestic output and per period terms of trade
toward their desired level. Indeed, as made clear by (31) and (39), terms-of-trade
movements influence both the aggregate demand and the aggregate supply curves.
Here, for the sake of simplicity, we discuss only the potential effects of terms-of-trade
movements on the average labor demand curve when prices are flexible. In this simple
case, since
Pi,t
PCi,t
= (1−τ)
(Ait)
ε
(ε−1)
W it
PCi,t
, it follows that:
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W it
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1
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Ait
}
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1
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{
Pi,t
PCi,t
Ait
}
(60)
To interpret (60), recall that
Pi,t
PCi,t
is a decreasing function of the terms of trade. Ac-
cording to (60) the higher is the covariance between the terms of trade and productivity
shocks, the more the per period terms of trade improve for a given real wage. As a
result, to improve their terms of trade, small country authorities may seek to raise this
covariance. In this way, labor demand is shifted downward, per period output falls and
the per period terms of trade can improve.
By using (20) and (92) we can rewrite (58) in terms of output gap, terms of trade
gap and inflation as:
1
1− τ˜
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[
1
2
$1,s(y˜
s
t )
2 +$11,s(s˜
s
iH,t)
2 +$12,s(s˜
s
iF,t)
2 +
1
2
$4,s(pii,t)
2
]
+ t.o.c. (61)
where $11,s and $12,s are define in (99) and x˜
s
t stands for the deviation of xˆt from its
target – i.e., x˜st ≡ xˆt− xˆst . Finally, the welfare losses in (61) allows us to formulate the
optimal monetary policy problem of the small open economy policy maker and retrieve
the corresponding first-order conditions (see (100) and (101) respectively).
5.4 The case of the big economy
As shown in Appendix D.3, if there is a monetary union in area H, the objective of
the monetary policy maker can be approximated in a purely quadratic way as:
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+ t.o.c. (62)
33In contrast, if ησ < 1, then κsH > 0 and small open economy policy makers have an incentive to over-
stabilize firms’ marginal costs. When, for instance, domestic technology improves, a stronger deterioration
of the terms of trade – still stronger than needed to keep firms’ marginal costs constant – prevents domestic
and foreign households from increasing their supply of state-contingent assets and their demand for foreign
goods. As a result, since home and foreign goods are complements in the utility, the demand for domestic
goods increases less, reducing output and consumption volatilities. In the case of ησ < 1, it is then by
amplifying terms of trade responses to productivity shocks that small open countries try to cut the costs of
consumption and labor fluctuations.
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where $1,b, $2,b, $3,b, $4,b, $5,b, $6,b, $7,b, $8,b, $9,b, $10,b, $11,b, $12,b, $13,b and
$14,b are listed in condition (112) and depend on the fundamental parameters of the
model. In addition t.o.c., ”the terms out of control” of the policy maker, include the
state-contingent path of piF,t decided by the policy maker of the monetary union in
area F and the differentials between country-specific and average-union variables.34
Similarly to the cooperative and the small open economy cases, the target of the mon-
etary union’s central bank can be determined by minimizing (62) subject to constraints
(113).
To grasp some insights about the incentives driving the policy maker of the mone-
tary union, we use condition (21) to retrieve from (116) the following expression:
[1− ζb(ϕ+ 1)] m̂ce,bH,t = ζb(ϕ+ 1)µˆH,t + κbH sˆbHF,t
−(ζw − ζb)(ϕ+ 1)m̂ce,bF,t = (ζw − ζb)(ϕ+ 1)µˆF,t + κbF sˆbHF,t (63)
where xˆbt stands for the target of the policy maker of the monetary union in area
H for the variable xˆt, m̂c
e,b
H,t and m̂c
e,b
F,t are defined in (42), while κ
b
H and κ
b
F are listed
in condition (118).35
By contrasting condition (63) with its counterparts – (55) and (59) –, we reach the
following conclusions:
1. The trade-off. According to (63), big economy policy makers face a trade-off
between: a) stabilizing the fluctuations of average-area efficient marginal costs, b)
manipulating the covariances between output and mark-up shocks of both areas,
c) influencing the volatility of the terms of trade between areas. The relative
strength of these incentives depends critically on the coefficients [1 − ζb(ϕ + 1)],
ζb(ϕ+ 1) , κ
b
H , −(ζw − ζb)(ϕ+ 1), (ζw − ζb)(ϕ+ 1) and κbF .
2. The weights of the trade-off and the steady-state distortion. In the case of the
big economy – differently from the cooperative case – the monetary authority
of area H attaches different weights to the stabilization of domestic and foreign
efficient marginal costs.36 This is because the per period terms of trade at the
symmetric steady state are inefficient from the area H policy maker’s perspective.
An improvement in the per period terms of trade (or a terms-of-trade worsening
if η is sufficiently low) is beneficial for domestic households since it generates
per period output differentials and allows to externalize labor effort. But despite
this desire and differently from the small open economy policy makers – who
care only about the performance of the domestic economy –, the central bank
of the area takes into account how its decisions affect the demand and supply of
foreign produced goods and the related feedback effects on its own economy. As
a result, the policy maker of the big economy tries to induce domestic households
to work relatively less (and possibly or alternatively to consume relatively more)
than foreign households, aiming at the same time, to allocate the world resources
efficiently. All these incentives are reflected in the coefficients of m̂ce,bH,t and m̂c
e,b
F,t.
The weight of domestic marginal cost is 1− ζb(ϕ+ 1) where ζb is determined by
Φb. Indeed, ζb =
Φb(γbσ+δbϕ)
(σ+ϕ)((2γb−1)σ+(2δb−1)ϕ) . It follows that ζb = 0 if and only if
34Indeed, without loss of generality, we assume that by choosing the average-union inflation, the common
central bank cares only about the average performance of the currency area. However, these terms have to
be taken into account for the welfare evaluation.
35The full set of conditions that jointly with (63) determine the target of the big economy is spelled out
in (117).
36Similar reasoning applies to the impact on the target of domestic and foreign mark-up shocks.
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domestic output is efficient from the big economy’s viewpoint (i.e., if and only if
Φb = 0). Then, as long as δb > 1 and Φb 6= 0, the authority of the monetary union
tries to push domestic per period output toward a level that is inefficiently low
from the cooperative viewpoint. In contrast, the weight of the foreign marginal
cost is −(ζw − ζb)(ϕ + 1) and corresponds – as long as δb > 1 – to the intention
of driving foreign per period output towards a level inefficiently high.37 In other
words, the policy maker in area H seeks to push domestic and foreign per period
output in opposite directions to generate – as long as δb > 1 – an improvement of
the cross-area terms of trade. However, the average weight corresponds to that of
the cooperative authorities, i.e., 1− ζb(ϕ+ 1)− (ζw − ζb)(ϕ+ 1) = 1− ζw(ϕ+ 1).
Despite the conflicts with other policy makers, the monetary authority of the
large economy wishes to make efficient use of the resources available in the world
economy.
3. The case for price stability. When ησ = 1, it follows that γb = δb. As a con-
sequence, κH = 0 and κF = 0 and m̂c
e,b
H,t = 0 and m̂c
e,b
F,t = 0. Then, under
productivity shocks, implementing the flexible-price allocation becomes the tar-
get of the common central bank and strict inflation targeting the optimal policy.
This result is consistent with other findings in the open macro literature – for
instance Benigno and Benigno (2003) and Benigno and Benigno (2006). The in-
tuition is exactly the same as explained for the case of the small open economies.
Open economy policy makers internalize that if ησ = 1 there is no reason to
manipulate the terms of trade because they cannot influence domestic output.
4. Mark-up shocks. Only when Φb 6= 0 or −(ζw−ζb)(ϕ+1) 6= 0, the common central
has the additional incentive to try to manipulate strategically the covariance
between outputs and mark-up shocks: by shifting the average labor supply curves
she tries to push domestic and foreign per period outputs towards their efficient
levels.
5. The terms-of-trade volatility. When ησ 6= 1, κbH 6= 0 and κbF 6= 0 and similarly
to small open economy authority, the monetary authority of the area seeks to
affect strategically the terms of trade volatility both to drive domestic and foreign
output towards the desired levels and to try to decrease the welfare costs of
consumption and leisure volatilities.
Big countries recognize the importance of an efficient use of the resources available
in the world economy. Nevertheless, they disagree on how much to produce and con-
sume individually. This free riding problem generates a conflict that translates into the
desire of manipulating the terms of trade between areas. Countries wish to out-source
production to allow domestic households to enjoy relatively more leisure or consump-
tion. This mechanism can even clarify why the size of the economy can shape optimal
policy decisions. When the economy is big, policy makers behave strategically: they
realize that they can influence the terms of trade by affecting domestic and foreign
outputs in opposite directions. At the same time, they internalize the effects that their
policies produce on the foreign economy – even if they disregard the effects on foreign
household welfare. They take into account, for instance, that when ησ > 1 domestic
terms of trade improve, not only the demand of domestic households but even that of
foreign consumers switches from domestic towards foreign goods, amplifying the effects
on output differentials. Differently, in the limiting case of a small economy, the only
37Indeed −(ζw − ζb)(ϕ+ 1) = 0 corresponds to τ˜ = −τ˜b. Only when −(ζw − ζb)(ϕ+ 1) = 0 does the target
become independent of m̂c
e,b
F,t and µ̂F,t: in this case foreign steady-state output is at the desired level from
the area H policy maker’s perspective.
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way monetary policy can manipulate the per period terms of trade in its favor is by
affecting per period domestic production. In fact, the economic performance of a small
open country is irrelevant for the behavior of the aggregate economy. However, the
joint policies of small open regions in one area can produce large business cycle effects
on both the domestic and the foreign area.
By using (21) and (116), the welfare approximation in (62) can be rewritten in
terms of the welfare relevant gaps as:
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where $15,b, $16,b and $17,b are defined in condition (120). Finally, we use the welfare
loss in (64) to formulate the optimal monetary policy problem of the policy maker
of the large open economy and to determine the associated first-order conditions (see
(122) and (123) respectively). Then, symmetric conditions can be stated for the foreign
area to determine the Nash equilibrium policies under regimes A and B.
6 Optimal policies
The purely-quadratic approximations enable us to solve the optimal policy problems of
both the small open economy and the monetary union policymakers and to simulate the
impact responses under the optimal policies of regimes A, B and C. Before examining
the results of the dynamic simulations, we discuss the baseline parametrization.
6.1 Parametrization
The baseline parametrization of the model shown in Table 1 is chosen having the
eurozone as a benchmark. The discount factor is set to 0.99 in order to match a steady-
state annual interest rate of 4 percent. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is
set equal to 12 , as in Pappa (2004) and Corsetti et al. (2010), while the labor supply
elasticity is 13 and the import share over GDP of the small open region is 40 percent
(i.e., αs = 0.6) consistently with Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005) and De Paoli (2009a).
Conversely, the degree of home bias of the area is set equal to 0.85 in line with Coenen,
Lombardo, Smets and Straub (2010) and Pappa (2004). The elasticity of substitution
across labor types and across varieties produced within the same region are set equal
to 6 and correspond to a 20 percent steady-state mark-up in the goods and in the labor
markets respectively. Furthermore, we assume that governments do not subsidize labor
– i.e., τ = 0. As a result, τ˜ is equal to −0.44 and the steady-state wedge between the
marginal rates of substitution and transformation is equal to 1.44, close to 1.38, the
calibration chosen by Benigno and Benigno (2006). In addition, θ the probability of
resetting the price is 0.75, implying an average price duration of 3 quarters. Moreover,
we parameterize the autocorrelation and the standard deviation of productivity shocks,
aˆt as in Coenen et al. (2010). Following De Paoli (2009a) and Benigno and Benigno
(2006) and in line with the findings of Adolfson, Lase´esen, Linde´ and Villani (2007) we
assume AR(1) mark-up shocks, µˆt, with an autocorrelation coefficient, ρµ, equal to 0.9.
Then, we set the standard deviation of mark-up shocks consistently with Coenen et al.
(2010). Finally, the correlation of productivity shocks across regions is set according
to Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005), while the correlation of mark-up shocks across regions is
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half of that of productivity.38 A more detailed description of the shock parametrization
is provided in Appendix E and in Section 7 we check the robustness of our findings to
a change in the calibration of various parameters.
There is no clear consensus in the literature on the parametrization of the trade
elasticity. If we just focus on the more recent studies, Broda and Weinstein (2006) and
Imbs and Me´jean (2011), for instance, suggest that a reasonable parametrization of the
trade elasticity should lie within 4 and 6 and above 6 respectively. Conversely using
Bayesian techniques, Rabanal and Tuesta (2010) estimate this elasticity to lie below 1,
consistently with the results of Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2008). Then, in line with
De-Paoli (2009b) and Rabitsch (2012) we allow the trade elasticity to vary from 0 to
3.939 and within this range we study the impact responses of the model under optimal
policies and the welfare gains across the different regimes.
6.2 Dynamic responses
Figure 2 depicts the impact responses to a one percent increase in domestic and for-
eign mark-ups as a function of the trade elasticity under optimal policies in regimes A,
B and C. Specifically, the plots show how the inflation output stabilization trade-off
generated by a global mark-up shock is modified by a rise in η (i.e., by a change in
the desired levels of per period output and in the corresponding perceptions of the
steady-state distortion).
Regime C (light blue line with triangles). In this case, the monetary union of the
world economy behaves like a closed economy and, not surprisingly, impact responses
are symmetric and independent of η. Given the increase in their marginal costs, both
domestic and foreign firms raise prices and reduce output supply. Workers cut con-
sumption and increase leisure. Then, the central bank of the monetary union faces
a trade-off between output and inflation stabilization and since under the baseline
parametrization per period output is inefficiently low, it wishes to stabilize inflation
more than output – compared to the case in which the steady state is Pareto efficient.
As emphasized above, amplifying the negative response of output reduces the covari-
ance between output and mark-up shocks, pushing households to increase their per
period labor effort. As a consequence, monetary policy is slightly expansionary and
while inflation increases up to 0.017 percent per quarter, output falls by 0.15 percent
per quarter.
Regime B (starred blue line). Under regime B, when there are two currency unions,
impact responses are symmetric across areas but not independent of the value of the
trade elasticity. For low values of η, the central banks of the monetary unions aim
to worsen the per period terms of trade. In this way per period consumption in the
domestic economy increases due to the additional labor effort that foreigners provide to
produce abroad. In order to deteriorate the per period terms of trade, monetary policy
makers attempt to over-stabilize foreign output – relatively more than the domestic one
– compared to what would be Pareto efficient. Put differently, monetary policy makers
try to generate a negative covariance between the terms of trade and global mark-up
shocks to induce domestic workers to raise their labor supply more than foreign house-
holds. As a result, for low values of η the monetary policy is more contractionary than
38Notice that this corresponds to a conservative configuration of this parameter. We check the sensitivity
of our results to a change in ςs,b in Tables 14 – 16.
39This range ensures that under the baseline calibration second-order conditions for the optimal policy
problems are satisfied in all regimes and purely random policies cannot be welfare improving. For a discussion
on this issue, see Benigno and Benigno (2006) and Benigno and Woodford (2005).
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under regime C. Obviously, in equilibrium none of the policy makers in areas H and
F reach their goal. Given symmetry, home and foreign outputs perfectly co-move in
such a way that the terms of trade are always equal to one. As the trade elasticity
becomes larger, and domestic and foreign goods become substitutes in the utility, the
incentives of the monetary authority turn around. Big economy policy makers seek to
under-stabilize foreign output in order to push the terms of trade to positively co-vary
with global mark-up shocks. In this way the per period terms of trade can improve and
domestic households can work less than foreign workers. Welfare in the home econ-
omy can rise. Indeed, as long as the per period terms of trade ameliorate, per period
consumption falls but not as much as the increase in leisure would require in a closed
economy; the risk sharing in consumption allows domestic households to benefit from
the increase in the per period foreign production. Then, given this incentive, when η
is large enough, monetary policy is more expansionary in response to a global mark-up
shock than under regime C.
Regime A (red line with squares). Under regime A, small open economies in area
H still retain monetary policy independence, whereas there is a monetary union in
area F . In this case, impact responses are neither symmetric nor independent of the
value of η. Since the mark-up shock is global, all the cross-area differences are driven
by the differences between monetary policies of the small open economies and of the
currency union. Similarly to what happens under regime B, the monetary policy of
the small country can be more or less expansionary than under regime C, depending
on the values of η. The rationale of this behavior is again explained by the desire of
manipulating the terms of trade. When η is low enough – in particular when domestic
and foreign goods are complements – small open economy policy makers try to worsen
the per period terms of trade and to raise per period consumption to take advantage of
the increase in the foreign country labor supply. For this reason, they under-stabilize
domestic output. Vice versa, for η large enough the incentive works in the opposite
direction. In this case small open economy authorities aim to improve the per period
terms the terms of trade to reduce household per period labor effort by over-stabilizing
domestic output.
However, as η increases and domestic and foreign goods become better substitutes
in the utility, the incentive of the small country policy makers to improve per period
terms of trade becomes stronger and stronger.40 Then, their monetary policy stance
becomes more and more expansionary – compared to those of the monetary authorities
under regime B and C – and exacerbates the ensued negative externalities both within
and across areas substantially. Their economies being small, the regional central banks
take as given what happens in the world economy. Thus, they disregard (as opposed
to the monetary authority of a currency area) how their joint policy decisions affect
the efficient allocation of resources of the world economy and the average performances
of both areas H and F . They are not aware that the welfare costs of their optimal
policies are potentially large. Inflation within area H rises considerably more than
under regimes B and C. At the same time, the benefits associated with the over-
stabilizing monetary policies cannot compensate the increase in the costs of inflation.
Indeed, on the one hand, under global shocks terms of trade do not improve within the
area in equilibrium – implying that there are no welfare benefits from domestic output
over-stabilization. On the other hand, even if small open economy authorities do not
realize that they monopoly power over the terms of trade between areas, these terms
40This incentive is the stronger the higher the trade elasticity, because the higher this elasticity, the more
households are willing to substitute the domestic goods with the foreign ones.
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of trade deteriorate – even more than required by the target of the policy maker of
the monetary union. Yet, the behavior of the central bank in area F suggests that the
welfare gains associated with this term-of-trade worsening cannot outweigh the welfare
costs of the increase in inflation. In fact, it is the central bank of area F that allows
for a deterioration of cross-area terms of trade by cutting the nominal interest rate
relatively more than under regime B, but less than the policy makers of area H. It
realizes what the welfare costs of the increase in inflation for the area as a whole are
and has a clear trade-off between opposing the expansionary policies of the small open
countries and properly stabilizing domestic price dynamics.41 While for low values of
η the balance tips in favor of inflation stabilization and inflation responses in area F
are similar across regimes, as the externalities become more severe, inflation rises in
the foreign area to dampen the fall in output.
There is a crucial question that is still left unanswered. What is the appropriate domain
of a monetary union from the perspective of area H (and F ) households? When are the
consumers of areas H and F better off? Under regimes A, B or C? These questions
are addressed in the next section.
7 Welfare evaluation
The analysis of the previous sections reveals that in our setting there are potential
welfare benefits from the adoption of a common currency. Moreover, it has been made
clear what the sources of these benefits are: more efficient use of the resources of the
economy, the internalization of the spill-over effects generated within area H and the
gains from controlling the cross-area terms of trade.
7.1 Welfare gains of a monetary union
The household welfare based criteria derived in (57) and (111) allows us to quantify the
welfare gains from being in a currency union expressed as a fraction of the corresponding
steady-state consumption. Figure 3 shows the differences in welfare under the baseline
calibration between being under regimes A or B (first two plots), B or C (third plot)
and A or C (fourth plot) for both domestic and foreign households as function of the
trade elasticity. There are three noteworthy conclusions we can draw from this figure:
1 As the first plot suggests, if there is a group of small open economies that decide
to be in a monetary union, welfare gains may be large. When η is greater than
1.8, the net benefits for the domestic households are positive and can reach the
considerable size of 27.8 percent of steady-state consumption as η approaches the
value of 3.9.42 At the same time, there can be welfare losses if η is sufficiently
small. However, these losses are on average lower than the potential gains espe-
cially if we exclude the smallest values of η, which are not very plausible. The
interpretation of this finding is quite clear. There is a trade-off for small open
countries between maintaining their monetary autonomy and being in a currency
area. The cost of a monetary union is due to the impossibility of properly stabi-
lizing region-specific shocks. The benefits are associated with the internalization
of the negative externalities produced by the beggar-thy-neighbor policies of the
41Notice that if there were a common central bank in the area H, it would face the same trade-off changing
its policy accordingly.
42We have not plotted in the figure the values of the welfare gains for η equal to 3.9 because altering its
scale renders the plot unreadable.
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small open economies, which disregard the effects that their joint decisions gen-
erate within and outside the area. Nevertheless, as the analysis of the impact
responses has demonstrated, these externalities are more severe for high values of
η, i.e., when home and foreign goods become more substitutable. As η increases,
the incentive of the small open economy policy makers to manipulate their per
period terms of trade and to increase inflation volatility becomes stronger and
hence the welfare benefits of a currency area are more substantial.
2 According to the third plot of Figure 3, under the baseline calibration there are
no welfare gains from being in a monetary union between the two areas. In
this case welfare losses fall in the range of −0.0096 and −0.0012 of the steady-
state consumption. Intuitively, if in this case the costs of being in a currency
area are smaller, benefits are smaller too because the monetary authorities of
the big economies are more concerned about inflation stabilization and less prone
to – compared to the small open economy central banks – adopting policies that
generate negative externalities for the other area. In fact, monetary authorities of
a currency area take into account how their decisions affect not only the domestic
but also the foreign economy performance. They realize the importance of an
efficient allocation of resources of the world economy as a whole, whereas small
open economy policy makers do not.
3 According to the fourth plot, if η is large enough, households of area F – and
even those in area H – benefit substantially from being in a monetary union
with the small open economies of area H. Again, the rationale of this result is
explained by the fact that joining the monetary union can discipline the highly
inflationary behavior of the small open economy policy makers. Put differently,
as is evident from the second plot, small country policies are welfare detrimental
even for the foreign area. Therefore, according to this result there is rationale for
the households of the area F to be in a monetary union that includes the small
open countries.
We can now use the previous findings to try to characterize the appropriate domain
of a currency area such as the European monetary union. According to our results
for sufficiently large values of η, there are welfare gains from the adoption of the euro
for the consumers living in the eurozone. From the perspective of these consumers it
might be a good idea to try to foster the process of enlargement of the euro to other
European countries. Conversely, it seems that being in a monetary union with a big
country like the U.S. cannot bring about sizable welfare benefits for the domestic and
foreign households.
7.2 Sensitivity analysis
In this section we analyze how these benefits vary according to the deep parameters of
the model.
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Both the intratemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution between home and foreign bundles, η, and the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution of consumption, σ−1, are crucial in order to determine the size of the wel-
fare gains (or losses) of abandoning monetary autonomy. The higher ησ is, the more
domestic and foreign goods are substitutes in the utility, the larger the expenditure-
switching effect of the demand from domestic towards foreign goods (intratemporal
effect) and the stronger the incentive to smooth consumption across periods (intertem-
poral effect). Then, the stronger the rise in foreign output due to a terms-of-trade
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improvement and the more domestic production falls allowing domestic households to
enjoy more leisure. In other words, these parameters determine the size of the negative
externality entailed by small open economy optimal policies and hence the benefits of
policy coordination that arise from being in a monetary union. Tables 2, 3 and 4 show
how welfare benefits increase as η and σ increase. η varies between 0 and 3.1, while
σ varies between 1 and 3.43 Within this range, the gains from being under regime B
instead of A for the consumers living in area H reach a maximum of 21 percent of
steady-state consumption. However, for sufficiently low levels of η the adoption of a
common currency brings about welfare losses up to 0.12 percent of steady-state con-
sumption.
The degree of home bias. The welfare benefits of a monetary union are due to the
internalization of the external effects produced both within and across areas. In order
to investigate which of these channels contributes more to explain these gains, we study
to what extent they depend on the degree of home bias of the area, αb. Tables 5, 6
and 7 report the welfare benefits with η and αb varying between 0 and 3.9 and between
0.6001 and 1 respectively. When αb is equal to 1, the area is closed and the only
source of benefits is the internalization of the external effects within the area. When
αb approaches to 0.6, there is very little trade within the areas. In this case, there
are almost no externalities within the area due to the small open economy optimal
policies and the welfare gains come from the reduction – or their complete elimination,
if regime C is considered – of the spill-over effects produced on the foreign area. When
regimes A and B are compared (Table 5), the case αb approaching 0.6 is especially
interesting because it makes it clear to what extent there are welfare benefits from
being in a monetary union even when there are no gains due to the internalization of
the spill-over effects within the area. In other words, when αb tends to 0.6, if welfare
in area H improves across regimes A and B, it is only because policy makers of the
big economies – differently from those of the small open economies – take into account
the equilibrium feedback effects stemming from the foreign area. According to our
simulation, the benefits can still be substantial even when αb approaches 0.6.
Finally, in Tables 8-22, we check the sensitivity of our findings to a change in other
parameters: ςs,µ and ςb,µ, the correlations of mark-up shocks across regions and areas,
τ , the employment subsidy, ρµ, the autocorrelation of mark-up shocks and σµ, the
standard deviation of mark-up shocks. Results are quite robust to these changes.
8 Conclusion
This paper provides a possible rationale for the process of the creation and enlargement
of the eurozone. It shows that as long as the monetary union is formed by a group of
small open economies, there can be sizable welfare gains from sharing the same currency
and from extending the currency area to another group of small open economies. Our
findings stem from the incentive of small open countries to generate potentially strong
negative externalities, which lead to large inflation volatility both in the foreign area,
which has a single monetary authority, and in the domestic area, in which the small
open countries still retain monetary autonomy. In this case, delegating the monetary
policy to a common central bank that sets the interest rate for the whole area acts
as a disciplining device against the potentially inflationary policies of the small open
43Again, we choose this range to ensure that the second-order conditions for the optimal policy problems
are satisfied in all regimes and purely random policies cannot be welfare improving.
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economies.
There are at least two extensions of the model that could be considered for future
research. First, it would be interesting to explore how results change once we allow for
incomplete risk sharing, i.e., when there is either financial autarchy or areas and/or
regions trade only a riskless bond.44 Under incomplete financial markets, we might
expect that the negative spill-overs due to open economy policies are stronger when
home and foreign goods are complements in the utility than when they are substitutes
(as suggested by De-Paoli (2009b)), reversing our findings under perfect risk sharing.
To see why this could be the case, recall that under complete markets consumption is
highly correlated across regions. For this reason, the more goods are substitutes, the
more households are indifferent between the consumption of domestic and foreign goods
and the stronger is the incentive of domestic policy makers to externalize labor effort
because they can reduce home production without suffering a large fall in home con-
sumption. The flip side of this result is that when goods are complements, the negative
spill-over effects are weak and then losing monetary autonomy is welfare detrimental
for the households living in the currency area. Conversely, under incomplete financial
markets, domestic production is more correlated with domestic consumption – under
financial autarky, for instance, consumption expenditure is completely financed by do-
mestic production. Then, when domestic and foreign goods are highly substitutable,
the incentive to manipulate the terms of trade might turn around. It is plausible that
as the terms of trade improve, the expenditure-switching effect causes consumption
to fall more than output, lowering household utility. On the other hand, if the trade
elasticity is low enough, a terms-of-trade improvement might generate welfare benefits.
In fact, the complementarity between home and foreign goods dampens the response of
consumption to a terms-of-trade improvement because of the increase in the demand
for foreign goods. Hence, domestic utility could rise given the possible contraction in
domestic production. In summary, we can expect that relaxing the assumption of com-
plete financial markets may change the set of parametric configurations under which
there are gains from being in a monetary union. However, we also expect that the
main conclusion of our analysis survives under imperfect risk sharing i.e., that even
under these circumstances the incentive to generate negative externalities – and then
the case for a monetary union – is stronger for the authorities of a group of small open
economies, since these authorities disregard the joint effects of their policies on foreign
economies.
A second interesting extension could be to allow for sticky wages.45 Introducing
sticky wages would render mark-up shocks endogenous, possibly strengthening the neg-
ative externalities of open economy policies under productivity shocks. Indeed, given
the impossibility to fully adjust the nominal wages, the fluctuations in the labor sup-
ply due to fluctuations in the terms of trade – through their effects on the household
purchasing power – might be larger. In other words, labor supply could become more
sensitive to changes in the terms of trade. Consequently, with sticky wages, the strate-
gic use of the terms-of-trade volatility might become more effective in influencing the
hedging properties of labor and in driving the per period output and the per period
terms of trade towards their desired levels. Thus the incentive of the policymakers
to produce negative spill-overs might become stronger even if it needs to be weighted
44For a contribution that studies models with incomplete financial markets, see e.g. Corsetti et al. (2008).
They show how imperfect risk sharing combined with low trade elasticities helps to reconcile international
business cycle models with the ”Backus Smith” puzzle – i.e., the empirical evidence that there is a low and
negative correlation between the real exchange rate and the relative consumption.
45For a small open economy model with sticky wages see e.g. Campolmi (2012).
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up against the effects on wage and price inflations implied by the manipulation of the
term-of-trade volatility.
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Figure 1: Desired level of steady state domestic output as function of the trade elasticity η.
Parameter Value Description
β 0.99 Preferences discount factor
σ−1 1/2 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption
ϕ−1 1/3 Frish elasticity of labor supply
αs 0.6 Degree of home bias in the regions
αb 0.85 Degree of home bias in the areas
ε 6 Elasticity of substitution across varieties
ν 6 Elasticity of substitution across labor types
θ 0.75 Probability of resetting prices
ρa 0.9 Autocorrelation of technological shocks
ρµ 0.9 Autocorrelation of mark-up shocks
τ 0 Steady-state labor subsidy
σa 0.0055 Standard deviation of the technological shocks
σµ 0.0262 Standard deviation of mark-up shock
ςa,b 0.258 Correlation of productivity shocks across areas
ςa,s 0.3 Correlation of productivity shocks across regions
ςµ,b 0.129 Correlation of mark-up shocks across areas
ςµ,s 0.15 Correlation of mark-up shocks across regions
Table 1: Baseline Parametrization.
34
0.
5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
3.
5
0
0.
51
1.
5
   
   
   
H
om
e 
O
ut
pu
t  
   
   
 
0.
5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
3.
5
-0
.3
-0
.2
5
-0
.2
-0
.1
5
-0
.1
   
   
  F
or
ei
gn
 O
ut
pu
t  
   
  
0.
5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
3.
5
-0
.200.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
   
   
 H
om
e 
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
   
  
0.
5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
3.
5
-0
.200.
2
0.
4
   
  F
or
ei
gn
 C
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
   
 
0.
5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
3.
5
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
   
   
  H
om
e 
In
fla
tio
n 
   
   
0.
5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
3.
5
0.
01
0.
02
0.
03
0.
04
0.
05
0.
06
   
   
 F
or
ei
gn
 In
fla
tio
n 
   
 
0.
5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
3.
5
-1
.2-1
-0
.8
-0
.6
-0
.4
-0
.20
  H
om
e 
N
om
in
al
 In
te
re
st
 R
at
e 
0.
5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
3.
5
-0
.8
-0
.6
-0
.4
-0
.20
Fo
re
ig
n 
N
om
in
al
 In
te
re
st
 R
at
e
0.
5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
3.
5
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
 T
er
m
s 
of
 T
ra
de
 a
cr
os
s 
A
re
as
 
 
 
R
eg
im
e 
A
R
eg
im
e 
B
R
eg
im
e 
C
F
ig
u
re
2:
Im
p
ac
t
re
sp
on
se
s
to
a
gl
ob
al
m
ar
k
-u
p
sh
o
ck
as
fu
n
ct
io
n
of
η
,
th
e
tr
ad
e
el
as
ti
ci
ty
.
35
0
0.
5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
3.
5
-0
.200.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81
1.
2
W
el
fa
re
 g
ai
ns
 fr
om
 b
ei
ng
 u
nd
er
 re
gi
m
e 
B
 in
st
ea
d 
of
 A
fo
r t
he
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
s 
of
 a
re
a 
H
Tr
ad
e 
el
as
tic
ity
0
0.
5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
3.
5
-0
.200.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81
1.
2
W
el
fa
re
 g
ai
ns
 fr
om
 b
ei
ng
 u
nd
er
 re
gi
m
e 
B
 in
st
ea
d 
of
 A
fo
r t
he
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
s 
of
 a
re
a 
F
Tr
ad
e 
el
as
tic
ity
0
0.
5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
3.
5
-1
0-9-8-7-6-5-4-3-2-1
x 
10
-3W
el
fa
re
 g
ai
ns
 fr
om
 b
ei
ng
 u
nd
er
 re
gi
m
e 
C
 in
st
ea
d 
of
 B
fo
r t
he
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
s 
of
 a
re
a 
H
Tr
ad
e 
el
as
tic
ity
0
0.
5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
3.
5
-0
.200.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81
1.
2
W
el
fa
re
 g
ai
ns
 fr
om
 b
ei
ng
 u
nd
er
 re
gi
m
e 
C
 in
st
ea
d 
of
 A
fo
r t
he
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
s 
of
 a
re
as
 H
 a
nd
 F
Tr
ad
e 
el
as
tic
ity
 
 
A
re
a 
H
A
re
a 
F
F
ig
u
re
3:
W
el
fa
re
ga
in
s
of
a
m
on
et
ar
y
u
n
io
n
.
36
Tables
The relative risk aversion σ
HHHHHHη
σ
1.0 1.29 1.57 1.86 2.14 2.43 2.71 3.0
0.0001 -0.0868 -0.0973 -0.105 -0.11 -0.114 -0.117 -0.12 -0.122
0.388 -0.0487 -0.0516 -0.0532 -0.054 -0.0545 -0.0546 -0.0546 -0.0545
0.775 -0.0306 -0.0313 -0.0313 -0.0311 -0.0307 -0.0303 -0.0298 -0.0294
1.16 -0.0204 -0.02 -0.0193 -0.0185 -0.0176 -0.0167 -0.0157 -0.0148
1.55 -0.0136 -0.0124 -0.0109 -0.00902 -0.00696 -0.00468 -0.0022 0.0005
1.94 -0.00839 -0.00584 -0.00246 0.0018 0.00706 0.0134 0.0211 0.0303
2.33 -0.00337 0.00169 0.00907 0.0195 0.0341 0.0543 0.0822 0.121
2.71 0.00245 0.0125 0.0292 0.0566 0.102 0.18 0.32 0.592
3.1 0.0104 0.0306 0.0705 0.152 0.336 0.825 2.65 21.0
Table 2: Welfare gains for households living in area H from being under regime B instead of A expressed
as a percentage of steady-state consumption.
HHHHHHη
σ
1.0 1.29 1.57 1.86 2.14 2.43 2.71 3.0
0.0001 0.0062 0.00486 0.00344 0.00208 0.0008 -0.0003 -0.00132 -0.00222
0.388 -0.00564 -0.00844 -0.0107 -0.0126 -0.0142 -0.0154 -0.0165 -0.0174
0.775 -0.00876 -0.0111 -0.0128 -0.0141 -0.015 -0.0158 -0.0163 -0.0168
1.16 -0.00898 -0.0105 -0.0114 -0.0118 -0.012 -0.012 -0.0118 -0.0115
1.55 -0.00785 -0.00825 -0.00796 -0.00713 -0.00589 -0.00429 -0.00239 -0.0002
1.94 -0.00574 -0.00453 -0.00218 0.00125 0.00578 0.0115 0.0184 0.0268
2.33 -0.00254 0.00139 0.00782 0.0173 0.0306 0.0492 0.0749 0.11
2.71 0.0022 0.0111 0.0264 0.0517 0.0935 0.164 0.291 0.534
3.1 0.00936 0.028 0.0647 0.139 0.305 0.741 2.35 18.4
Table 3: Welfare gains for households living in area F from being under regime C instead of A expressed
as a percentage of steady-state consumption.
HHHHHHη
σ
1.0 1.29 1.57 1.86 2.14 2.43 2.71 3.0
0.0001 -0.00659 -0.00771 -0.00859 -0.00928 -0.00984 -0.0103 -0.0107 -0.011
0.388 -0.00499 -0.00565 -0.00613 -0.00649 -0.00677 -0.00698 -0.00715 -0.00728
0.775 -0.00394 -0.00436 -0.00465 -0.00486 -0.00501 -0.00512 -0.0052 -0.00527
1.16 -0.0032 -0.00348 -0.00367 -0.00379 -0.00388 -0.00394 -0.00398 -0.00401
1.55 -0.00265 -0.00285 -0.00297 -0.00305 -0.0031 -0.00313 -0.00316 -0.00317
1.94 -0.00224 -0.00237 -0.00246 -0.00251 -0.00253 -0.00255 -0.00256 -0.00256
2.33 -0.00191 -0.00201 -0.00206 -0.00209 -0.0021 -0.00211 -0.00211 -0.00211
2.71 -0.00164 -0.00171 -0.00175 -0.00176 -0.00177 -0.00177 -0.00176 -0.00176
3.1 -0.00143 -0.00147 -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.00149 -0.00148
Table 4: Welfare gains for households living in area H (or F ) from being under regime C instead of B
expressed as a percentage of steady-state consumption.
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The degree of home bias in the area αb
HHHHHHη
αb 0.6 0.657 0.714 0.771 0.829 0.886 0.943 1.0
0.0001 -0.11 -0.115 -0.117 -0.116 -0.114 -0.11 -0.106 -0.101
0.488 -0.0308 -0.035 -0.0386 -0.042 -0.0453 -0.0485 -0.0516 -0.0547
0.975 -0.0154 -0.017 -0.0187 -0.0205 -0.0227 -0.0253 -0.0285 -0.0328
1.46 -0.00753 -0.00798 -0.0085 -0.00913 -0.00994 -0.011 -0.0126 -0.0151
1.95 0.00197 0.00242 0.00292 0.00356 0.0044 0.00562 0.00756 0.0112
2.44 0.0241 0.0258 0.028 0.0307 0.0346 0.0403 0.0502 0.0714
2.93 0.0983 0.104 0.11 0.118 0.13 0.148 0.181 0.262
3.41 0.512 0.532 0.556 0.589 0.636 0.714 0.861 1.26
3.9 28.1 25.5 25.1 25.6 26.9 29.5 35.3 55.9
Table 5: Welfare gains for households living in area H from being under regime B instead of A expressed
as a percentage of steady-state consumption.
HHHHHHη
αb 0.6 0.657 0.714 0.771 0.829 0.886 0.943 1.0
0.001 -0.00864 -0.00176 0.00194 0.003 0.00212 -0.0008 -0.00286 -0.00606
0.488 -0.03 -0.0259 -0.0223 -0.0188 -0.0156 -0.0123 -0.00917 -0.00606
0.975 -0.0208 -0.0193 -0.0178 -0.0162 -0.0143 -0.0122 -0.0095 -0.00606
1.46 -0.00979 -0.00944 -0.00908 -0.0087 -0.00825 -0.00772 -0.00704 -0.00606
1.95 0.00766 0.00712 0.00646 0.0056 0.0044 0.00261 -0.0003 -0.00606
2.44 0.0464 0.0445 0.0421 0.0391 0.0349 0.0286 0.0176 -0.00606
2.93 0.164 0.158 0.151 0.142 0.13 0.111 0.0768 -0.00606
3.41 0.767 0.739 0.709 0.671 0.62 0.54 0.392 -0.00606
3.9 38.1 32.5 29.7 27.5 25.3 22.2 16.6 -0.00606
Table 6: Welfare gains for households living in area F from being under regime C instead of A expressed
as a percentage of steady-state consumption.
HHHHHHη
αb 0.6 0.657 0.714 0.771 0.829 0.886 0.943 1.0
0.0001 -0.0171 -0.0156 -0.0138 -0.012 -0.0102 -0.00861 -0.00723 -0.00606
0.488 -0.00614 -0.00615 -0.00615 -0.00614 -0.00612 -0.00611 -0.00609 -0.00606
0.975 -0.00329 -0.00342 -0.0036 -0.00384 -0.00417 -0.00461 -0.00521 -0.00606
1.46 -0.00202 -0.00216 -0.00236 -0.00264 -0.00304 -0.00362 -0.00452 -0.00606
1.95 -0.00132 -0.00146 -0.00164 -0.00191 -0.00231 -0.00292 -0.00397 -0.00606
2.44 -0.0009 -0.00101 -0.00118 -0.00143 -0.0018 -0.00241 -0.00351 -0.00606
2.93 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.00109 -0.00144 -0.00201 -0.00314 -0.00606
3.41 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.00116 -0.0017 -0.00281 -0.00606
3.9 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0009 -0.00145 -0.00254 -0.00606
Table 7: Welfare gains for households living in area H (or F ) from being under regime C instead of B
expressed as a percentage of steady-state consumption.
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The labor subsidy τ
HHHHHHη
τ
-0.39 -0.291 -0.191 -0.0919 0.00749 0.107 0.206 0.306
0.0001 -0.107 -0.108 -0.109 -0.111 -0.113 -0.115 -0.117 -0.121
0.388 -0.0534 -0.0536 -0.0538 -0.054 -0.0543 -0.0547 -0.0552 -0.0558
0.775 -0.0316 -0.0315 -0.0313 -0.0311 -0.0309 -0.0306 -0.0303 -0.0299
1.16 -0.02 -0.0197 -0.0192 -0.0187 -0.018 -0.0172 -0.0161 -0.0145
1.55 -0.0122 -0.0115 -0.0106 -0.00944 -0.00788 -0.00571 -0.00253 0.00246
1.94 -0.00532 -0.00385 -0.0019 0.0008 0.00464 0.0105 0.0201 0.0375
2.33 0.00293 0.00606 0.0105 0.017 0.0272 0.0444 0.0771 0.149
2.71 0.0154 0.0223 0.0328 0.0497 0.0794 0.138 0.28 0.765
3.1 0.0376 0.054 0.0812 0.131 0.236 0.519 1.75 41.4
Table 8: Welfare gains for households living in area H from being under regime B instead of A expressed
as a percentage of steady-state consumption. Here, as in the following tables, τ , the labor subsidy, varies
between −0.39, a value which corresponds a 39 percent labor tax and 0.306, the value of τ for which the
monopolistic distortion in the labor and in the good markets are completely eliminated.
HHHHHHη
τ
-0.39 -0.291 -0.191 -0.0919 0.00749 0.107 0.206 0.306
0.0001 -0.001 -0.0005 0.00005 0.0007 0.0015 0.00248 0.00369 0.00525
0.388 -0.0136 -0.0136 -0.0135 -0.0135 -0.0134 -0.0134 -0.0133 -0.0132
0.775 -0.0145 -0.0145 -0.0145 -0.0146 -0.0146 -0.0146 -0.0146 -0.0146
1.16 -0.0126 -0.0125 -0.0124 -0.0122 -0.0119 -0.0115 -0.0109 -0.00989
1.55 -0.00952 -0.00907 -0.00847 -0.00764 -0.00645 -0.00471 -0.002 0.00245
1.94 -0.00501 -0.0038 -0.00214 0.0002 0.00369 0.00907 0.018 0.0341
2.33 0.0019 0.00474 0.00879 0.0148 0.0243 0.0403 0.0703 0.136
2.71 0.0134 0.0198 0.0296 0.0453 0.0726 0.126 0.253 0.678
3.1 0.0342 0.0494 0.0746 0.12 0.215 0.466 1.54 35.3
Table 9: Welfare gains for households living in area F from being under regime C instead of A expressed
as a percentage of steady-state consumption.
HHHHHHη
τ
-0.39 -0.291 -0.191 -0.0919 0.00749 0.107 0.206 0.306
0.0001 -0.00931 -0.00936 -0.00942 -0.0095 -0.00958 -0.00969 -0.00982 -0.01
0.388 -0.00651 -0.00654 -0.00657 -0.0066 -0.00664 -0.0067 -0.00676 -0.00685
0.775 -0.00488 -0.0049 -0.00491 -0.00492 -0.00494 -0.00496 -0.00499 -0.00504
1.16 -0.00383 -0.00383 -0.00384 -0.00384 -0.00384 -0.00385 -0.00385 -0.00386
1.55 -0.0031 -0.0031 -0.00309 -0.00309 -0.00308 -0.00307 -0.00306 -0.00304
1.94 -0.00257 -0.00256 -0.00255 -0.00254 -0.00252 -0.0025 -0.00248 -0.00244
2.33 -0.00217 -0.00215 -0.00214 -0.00212 -0.0021 -0.00207 -0.00203 -0.00198
2.71 -0.00185 -0.00184 -0.00182 -0.00179 -0.00177 -0.00173 -0.00168 -0.00161
3.1 -0.0016 -0.00158 -0.00156 -0.00153 -0.0015 -0.00146 -0.0014 -0.00131
Table 10: Welfare gains for households living in area H (or F ) from being under regime C instead of B
expressed as a percentage of steady-state consumption.
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The mark-up shock correlation across regions ςs,µ
HHHHHHη
ςs,µ 0 0.143 0.286 0.429 0.571 0.714 0.857 1.0
0.0001 -0.125 -0.113 -0.101 -0.0899 -0.0784 -0.0668 -0.0553 -0.0437
0.388 -0.0511 -0.0467 -0.0423 -0.0378 -0.0334 -0.029 -0.0245 -0.0201
0.775 -0.0258 -0.0237 -0.0216 -0.0194 -0.0173 -0.0151 -0.013 -0.0108
1.16 -0.0115 -0.0104 -0.00918 -0.00801 -0.00683 -0.00565 -0.00447 -0.0033
1.55 0.00404 0.00476 0.00548 0.00621 0.00693 0.00765 0.00837 0.0091
1.94 0.0359 0.0364 0.0369 0.0374 0.0379 0.0384 0.0389 0.0394
2.33 0.135 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.137 0.137 0.138 0.138
2.71 0.659 0.66 0.662 0.664 0.666 0.667 0.669 0.671
3.1 27.0 27.7 28.3 29.0 29.7 30.4 31.0 31.7
Table 11: Welfare gains for households living in area H from being under regime B instead of A expressed
as a percentage of steady-state consumption.
HHHHHHη
ςs,µ 0 0.143 0.286 0.429 0.571 0.714 0.857 1.0
0.0001 0.00669 0.00169 -0.0033 -0.0083 -0.0133 -0.0183 -0.0233 -0.02834
0.488 -0.0128 -0.0143 -0.0157 -0.0171 -0.0186 -0.02 -0.0214 -0.0228
0.975 -0.0131 -0.0135 -0.014 -0.0144 -0.0149 -0.0153 -0.0157 -0.0162
1.46 -0.00799 -0.00807 -0.00815 -0.00823 -0.00831 -0.00839 -0.00847 -0.00855
1.95 0.00378 0.00381 0.00385 0.00388 0.00391 0.00395 0.00398 0.00402
2.44 0.0329 0.0329 0.0329 0.0329 0.0329 0.0329 0.0328 0.0328
2.92 0.124 0.124 0.124 0.124 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.123
3.41 0.595 0.595 0.595 0.594 0.594 0.594 0.594 0.594
3.9 23.7 24.2 24.8 25.3 25.9 26.5 27.0 27.6
Table 12: Welfare gains for households living in area F from being under regime C instead of A expressed
as a percentage of steady-state consumption.
HHHHHHη
ςs,µ 0 0.143 0.286 0.429 0.571 0.714 0.857 1.0
0.0001 -0.00554 -0.00939 -0.0132 -0.0171 -0.0209 -0.0248 -0.0286 -0.0324
0.488 -0.00371 -0.00601 -0.00831 -0.0106 -0.0129 -0.0152 -0.0175 -0.0198
0.975 -0.00273 -0.00424 -0.00576 -0.00728 -0.00879 -0.0103 -0.0118 -0.0133
1.46 -0.00213 -0.00318 -0.00423 -0.00528 -0.00633 -0.00738 -0.00843 -0.00948
1.95 -0.00173 -0.00247 -0.00321 -0.00396 -0.0047 -0.00545 -0.00619 -0.00694
2.44 -0.00144 -0.00197 -0.0025 -0.00303 -0.00356 -0.00409 -0.00462 -0.00515
2.92 -0.00123 -0.0016 -0.00197 -0.00234 -0.00271 -0.00308 -0.00345 -0.00382
3.41 -0.00106 -0.00131 -0.00156 -0.00181 -0.00206 -0.00231 -0.00256 -0.00281
3.9 -0.0009 -0.00109 -0.00124 -0.00139 -0.00155 -0.0017 -0.00186 -0.00201
Table 13: Welfare gains for households living in area H (or F ) from being under regime C instead of B
expressed as a percentage of steady-state consumption.
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The mark-up shock correlation across areas ςb,µ
HHHHHHη
ςb,µ 0 0.143 0.286 0.429 0.571 0.714 0.857 1.0
0.0001 -0.112 -0.112 -0.112 -0.112 -0.112 -0.112 -0.112 -0.112
0.488 -0.0465 -0.0465 -0.0465 -0.0465 -0.0465 -0.0465 -0.0465 -0.0465
0.975 -0.0236 -0.0236 -0.0236 -0.0236 -0.0236 -0.0236 -0.0236 -0.0236
1.46 -0.0103 -0.0103 -0.0103 -0.0103 -0.0103 -0.0103 -0.0103 -0.0103
1.95 0.0048 0.0048 0.0048 0.00479 0.00479 0.00479 0.00478 0.00478
2.44 0.0364 0.0364 0.0364 0.0364 0.0364 0.0364 0.0364 0.0364
2.93 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.135 0.135 0.135 0.135
3.41 0.661 0.661 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66
3.9 27.7 27.7 27.7 27.7 27.7 27.7 27.7 27.7
Table 14: Welfare gains for households living in area H from being under regime B instead of A expressed
as a percentage of steady-state consumption.
HHHHHHη
ςb,µ 0 0.143 0.286 0.429 0.571 0.714 0.857 1.0
0.0001 0.0008 0.0015 0.00217 0.00283 0.00349 0.00415 0.00482 0.00548
0.488 -0.0147 -0.0143 -0.0139 -0.0135 -0.0131 -0.0127 -0.0123 -0.0119
0.975 -0.0138 -0.0135 -0.0133 -0.013 -0.0127 -0.0125 -0.0122 -0.0119
1.46 -0.00824 -0.00805 -0.00786 -0.00766 -0.00747 -0.00727 -0.00708 -0.00688
1.95 0.00368 0.00383 0.00399 0.00414 0.0043 0.00445 0.00461 0.00476
2.44 0.0328 0.0329 0.033 0.0332 0.0333 0.0335 0.0336 0.0337
2.93 0.124 0.124 0.124 0.124 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125
3.41 0.595 0.595 0.595 0.595 0.595 0.595 0.596 0.596
3.9 24.2 24.2 24.2 24.2 24.2 24.2 24.2 24.2
Table 15: Welfare gains for households living in area F from being under regime C instead of A expressed
as a percentage of steady-state consumption.
HHHHHHη
ςb,µ 0 0.143 0.286 0.429 0.571 0.714 0.857 1.0
0.0001 -0.0102 -0.00951 -0.00885 -0.00819 -0.00752 -0.00686 -0.0062 -0.00554
0.488 -0.00648 -0.00608 -0.00568 -0.00529 -0.00489 -0.00449 -0.0041 -0.0037
0.975 -0.00456 -0.00429 -0.00403 -0.00376 -0.0035 -0.00323 -0.00297 -0.00271
1.46 -0.0034 -0.00321 -0.00302 -0.00283 -0.00264 -0.00246 -0.00227 -0.00208
1.95 -0.00263 -0.00249 -0.00235 -0.00221 -0.00207 -0.00193 -0.00179 -0.00164
2.44 -0.00209 -0.00198 -0.00187 -0.00176 -0.00166 -0.00155 -0.00144 -0.00133
2.93 -0.00169 -0.00161 -0.00152 -0.00143 -0.00134 -0.00126 -0.00117 -0.00108
3.41 -0.00139 -0.00132 -0.00124 -0.00117 -0.0011 -0.00103 -0.001 -0.0009
3.9 -0.00115 -0.00109 -0.00103 -0.001 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0007
Table 16: Welfare gains for households living in area H (or F ) from being under regime C instead of B
expressed as a percentage of steady-state consumption.
41
The autocorrelation of the mark-up shocks ρµ
HHHHHHη
ρµ 0 0.141 0.283 0.424 0.566 0.707 0.849 0.99
0.0001 -0.0219 -0.022 -0.0224 -0.0234 -0.0257 -0.0312 -0.0457 -0.0907
0.488 -0.0101 -0.0102 -0.0103 -0.0108 -0.0119 -0.0142 -0.0196 -0.0337
0.975 -0.00601 -0.00602 -0.00608 -0.00628 -0.00674 -0.00781 -0.0103 -0.0161
1.46 -0.00407 -0.00402 -0.0039 -0.00377 -0.0037 -0.00385 -0.00459 -0.0068
1.95 -0.00298 -0.00279 -0.00226 -0.00146 -0.0004 0.0007 0.00201 0.00289
2.44 -0.00229 -0.00172 -0.0001 0.00246 0.00596 0.0104 0.0159 0.0225
2.93 -0.00183 0.0001 0.00522 0.0136 0.0252 0.0404 0.0596 0.0838
3.41 -0.00149 0.00681 0.0305 0.069 0.123 0.196 0.29 0.411
3.9 -0.0004 0.219 0.895 2.11 4.05 7.02 11.6 18.8
Table 17: Welfare gains for households living in area H from being under regime B instead of A expressed
as a percentage of steady-state consumption.
HHHHHHη
ρµ 0 0.141 0.283 0.424 0.566 0.707 0.849 0.99
0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0003 0.0003 0.00205
0.488 -0.00342 -0.00344 -0.00351 -0.00366 -0.00399 -0.00467 -0.00619 -0.00997
0.975 -0.00338 -0.00339 -0.00343 -0.00356 -0.00385 -0.0045 -0.00591 -0.00914
1.46 -0.00299 -0.00295 -0.00285 -0.00275 -0.00271 -0.00288 -0.00355 -0.00541
1.95 -0.0026 -0.00242 -0.00194 -0.00121 -0.0003 0.0007 0.00165 0.00212
2.44 -0.00227 -0.00172 -0.0002 0.0022 0.00545 0.00953 0.0145 0.0201
2.93 -0.00198 -0.0003 0.00458 0.0123 0.0231 0.037 0.0546 0.0765
3.41 -0.00174 0.00578 0.0272 0.062 0.111 0.176 0.261 0.37
3.9 -0.0008 0.192 0.785 1.85 3.55 6.15 10.2 16.5
Table 18: Welfare gains for households living in area F from being under regime C instead of A expressed
as a percentage of steady-state consumption.
HHHHHHη
ρµ 0 0.141 0.283 0.424 0.566 0.707 0.849 0.99
0.0001 -0.00277 -0.00278 -0.0028 -0.00286 -0.003 -0.00334 -0.00419 -0.0067
0.488 -0.00185 -0.00186 -0.00188 -0.00192 -0.00202 -0.00224 -0.00273 -0.00401
0.975 -0.00136 -0.00137 -0.00138 -0.00142 -0.00149 -0.00164 -0.00196 -0.00271
1.46 -0.00106 -0.00107 -0.00108 -0.0011 -0.00116 -0.00126 -0.00148 -0.00196
1.95 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.00101 -0.00116 -0.00148
2.44 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.00116
2.93 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0009
3.41 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0007
3.9 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005
Table 19: Welfare gains for households living in area H (or F ) from being under regime C instead of B
expressed as a percentage of steady-state consumption.
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The standard deviation of the mark-up shocks σµ
HHHHHHη
σµ 0 0.00471 0.00943 0.0141 0.0189 0.0236 0.0283 0.033
0.0001 -0.0438 -0.046 -0.0527 -0.0638 -0.0794 -0.0994 -0.124 -0.153
0.488 -0.0202 -0.0211 -0.0236 -0.0279 -0.0338 -0.0415 -0.0509 -0.0619
0.975 -0.012 -0.0124 -0.0135 -0.0154 -0.018 -0.0214 -0.0255 -0.0304
1.46 -0.00813 -0.0082 -0.00842 -0.00877 -0.00926 -0.00989 -0.0107 -0.0116
1.95 -0.00595 -0.0056 -0.00456 -0.00282 -0.0004 0.00276 0.0066 0.0111
2.44 -0.00459 -0.00326 0.0007 0.00738 0.0167 0.0287 0.0433 0.0606
2.93 -0.00366 0.0008 0.0144 0.037 0.0686 0.109 0.159 0.218
3.41 -0.00298 0.0185 0.0831 0.191 0.341 0.535 0.772 1.05
3.9 -0.0008 0.897 3.59 8.08 14.4 22.4 32.3 44.0
Table 20: Welfare gains for households living in area H from being under regime B instead of A expressed
as a percentage of steady-state consumption.
HHHHHHη
σµ 0 0.00471 0.00943 0.0141 0.0189 0.0236 0.0283 0.033
0.0001 -0.00147 -0.00137 -0.00109 -0.0006 0.0004 0.0009 0.00192 0.00315
0.488 -0.00685 -0.00709 -0.00782 -0.00904 -0.0107 -0.0129 -0.0156 -0.0187
0.975 -0.00676 -0.00698 -0.00764 -0.00874 -0.0103 -0.0123 -0.0147 -0.0176
1.46 -0.00598 -0.00605 -0.00625 -0.00659 -0.00706 -0.00767 -0.00842 -0.0093
1.95 -0.0052 -0.00491 -0.00403 -0.00257 -0.0005 0.00211 0.00532 0.00912
2.44 -0.00453 -0.00332 0.0003 0.00639 0.0149 0.0258 0.0392 0.0549
2.93 -0.00397 0.0009 0.0126 0.0334 0.0625 0.0998 0.146 0.199
3.41 -0.00348 0.0159 0.0741 0.171 0.307 0.482 0.695 0.947
3.9 -0.00161 0.785 3.14 7.07 12.6 19.7 28.3 38.5
Table 21: Welfare gains for households living in area F from being under regime C instead of A expressed
as a percentage of steady-state consumption.
HHHHHHη
σµ 0 0.00471 0.00943 0.0141 0.0189 0.0236 0.0283 0.033
0.0001 -0.00554 -0.00567 -0.00606 -0.00672 -0.00763 -0.00881 -0.0103 -0.012
0.488 -0.0037 -0.00378 -0.00402 -0.00441 -0.00496 -0.00566 -0.00652 -0.00754
0.975 -0.00273 -0.00278 -0.00293 -0.00319 -0.00355 -0.00402 -0.00458 -0.00526
1.46 -0.00213 -0.00216 -0.00227 -0.00245 -0.0027 -0.00302 -0.00341 -0.00388
1.95 -0.00172 -0.00175 -0.00183 -0.00195 -0.00213 -0.00236 -0.00264 -0.00297
2.44 -0.00144 -0.00146 -0.00151 -0.0016 -0.00173 -0.00189 -0.00209 -0.00232
2.93 -0.00123 -0.00124 -0.00128 -0.00134 -0.00143 -0.00154 -0.00168 -0.00184
3.41 -0.00106 -0.00107 -0.0011 -0.00114 -0.0012 -0.00127 -0.00137 -0.00148
3.9 -0.0009 -0009 -0.001 -0.001 -0.00102 -0.00106 -0.00112 -0.00119
Table 22: Welfare gains for households living in area H (or F ) from being under regime C instead of B
expressed as a percentage of steady-state consumption.
43
Appendix
A Retrieving condition (18)
Given the definitions of P ∗H,t and P
∗
F,t it is easy to show that:
EiH,tP ∗H,t = [αbPH,t1−η+(1−αb)PF,t1−η]
1
1−η EiF,tP ∗F,t = [αbPF,t1−η+(1−αb)PH,t1−η]
1
1−η
(65)
By (65):
EiH,tP ∗H,t
PH,t
=
[
αb + (1− αb)
(
PF,t
PH,t
)1−η] 11−η EiF,tP ∗F,t
PF,t
=
[
αb + (1− αb)
(
PH,t
PF,t
)1−η] 11−η
(66)
which jointly with (17) leads to:
(
C∗F,t
C∗H,t
)
=
αb
(
PF,t
PH,t
)1−η
+ (1− αb)
(1− αb)
(
PF,t
PH,t
)1−η
+ αb

− 1
σ(1−η)
(67)
Moreover thanks to (5):
Pi,t
PCi,t
=
[
1
αs
− αb − αs
αs
(
PH,t
PCi,t
)1−η
− (1− αb)
αs
(
PF,t
PCi,t
)1−η] 11−η
i ∈ [0, 1
2
) (68)
from which using (17) it follows that:
Pi,t
PCi,t
=
 1
αs
− αb − αs
αs
(
PH,t
Ei,HP ∗H,t
)(1−η)(
C∗H,t
Cit
)−σ(1−η)
− (1− αb)
αs
(
PF,t
Ei,FP ∗F,t
)(1−η)(
C∗F,t
Cit
)−σ(1−η) 11−η
(69)
Finally, by using (66) and (67) we can rewrite (69) as (18).
B The Pareto-efficient allocation
In this appendix we solve the social planner problem and find the conditions that
characterize the Pareto-efficient allocation. The social planner maximizes the world
welfare with respect to Y it , N
i
t and C
i
j,t for all i and j:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{∫ 1
0
Cit
1−σ
1− σ −
1
ϕ+ 1
(
N it
)ϕ+1
di
}
(70)
where Cit is defined consistently with (2) and (3).
subject to resource and the technological constraints:
Y it = C
i
i,t +
∫ 1
2
0
Cji,tdj +
∫ 1
1
2
Cji,tdj i ∈ [0, 1]
Y it = A
i
tN
i
t i ∈ [0, 1] (71)
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Notice that as in Gal´ı and Monacelli (2009) the previous constraints already incor-
porate the optimal condition whereby consumption and production of each variety is
identical within each region i. According to the first-order conditions:
Cit
−σ
=
αs(Y it ϕ+1
Ait
ϕ
)1−η
+ 2(αb − αs)
∫ 1
2
0
(
Y jt
ϕ+1
Ajt
ϕ
)1−η
dj + 2(1− αb)
∫ 1
1
2
(
Y jt
ϕ+1
Ajt
ϕ
)1−η
dj
 11−η
Y it
1+ϕη
Ait
(ϕ+1)η
=
[
αsC
i
t
1−ση
+ 2(αb − αs)
∫ 1
2
0
Cjt
1−ση
dj + 2(1− αb)
∫ 1
1
2
Cjt
1−ση
dj
]
(72)
for all i ∈ [0, 12). Symmetric conditions apply to the each region i with i ∈ [12 , 1]. The
first condition in (72) states that at the margin the utility embedded into an additional
unit of the composite consumption bundle Cit should be equal to a CES aggregation of
the additional disutilities entailed by its production. Conversely, the second condition
in (72) rewrites the resource constraint in terms of aggregate consumption of each
region j by using the technological constraints and the other optimality conditions.
By taking the log-linear approximation to (72) and integrating them over i ∈ [0, 12)
we find that:
− σcˆeH,t = αb(ϕyˆeH,t − (ϕ+ 1)aˆH,t) + (1− αb)(ϕyˆeF,t − (ϕ+ 1)aˆF,t)
(1 + ϕη)yˆeH,t − (1 + ϕ)ηaˆH,t = (1− ησ)(αbcˆeH,t + (1− αb)cˆeF,t) (73)
where the suffix e stands for efficient.
C Zero-inflation deterministic steady state
In this appendix we argue that, given appropriate initial conditions, zero inflation is
a Nash equilibrium policy at the deterministic steady state under both regimes A and
B.
Under the regime A, the timelessly optimal policy problem of a monetary authority
of country i in the area H can be formulated as the maximization of the following
Lagragian:
Ls = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
Cit
1−σ
1− σ −
1
ϕ+ 1
(
Y it Z
i
t
Ait
)ϕ+1
+ ζs,i1,t
[
Y it −
(
Pi,t
PCi,t
)−η (
αsC
i
t + (αb − αs)CitσηCH,t + (1− αb)CitσηCF,t
)]
+ ζs,i2,t
[
Kit −
(
Y it
Ait
)ϕ+1
Zit
ϕ
(1 + µit)(1− τ i)
ε
ε− 1
]
− ζs,i2,t−1θΠεi,tKit
+ ζs,i3,t
[
F it − Y it Cit−σ
P it
PCi,t
]
− ζs,i3,t−1θΠ(ε−1)i,t F it
+ ζs,i4,t
F it −Kit
(
1− θΠε−1i,t
1− θ
) 1
ε−1

+ ζs,i5,t
Zit − θZit−1Πεi,t − (1− θ)
(
1− θΠε−1i,t
1− θ
) ε
ε−1

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where Pi,t/PCi,t are determined consistently with (18), while C
∗
H,t, C
∗
F,t, CH,t and CF,t
are taken as given.46 Assume that µjt = µ, A
j
t = 1, τ
j = τ , Zjt = Πj,t = 1 and Z
j
−1 = 1
for all t and j 6= i with j ∈ [0, 1]. In addition, assume that Zi−1 = 1 for all i ∈ [0, 1].
Recalling that τ˜ = 1 − (1 − τ)(1 + µ) εε−1 it can be shown that at the deterministic
steady state zero-inflation is an optimal policy, i.e., being a solution of the first-order
conditions of the Lagrangian stated in (74), zero-inflation is best response to the zero-
inflation policies of the other policymakers in area F and H. Indeed, if Zit = Πi,t = 1
at all t, then according to the first-order conditions of (74) with respect to Cit , Y
i
t , Z
i
t ,
Kit , F
i
t and Πi,t at the symmetric deterministic steady state:
C−σ = ζs1δs − ζs3σγsY C−σ−1
Y ϕ = ζs1 − ζs2(ϕ+ 1)Y ϕ(1− τ˜)− ζs3C−σ
Y ϕ+1 = −ζs2ϕY ϕ+1(1− τ˜) + ζs5(1− βθ)
ζs2(1− θ) = ζs4
ζs3(1− θ) = −ζs4
ζs2θεK = −ζs3θ(ε− 1)F + ζs4
θ
1− θK (74)
with γs =
1
αs
and δs = αs(1− ση) + γsησ. Then:
Y = (1− τ˜)− 1σ+ϕ
C = Y
F = K =
Y C−σ
1− βθ =
Y ϕ+1(1− τ˜)
1− βθ
Π = ΠH = ΠF = Z = 1
ζs1 = Y
ϕ (1− ϕζs) ζs2 = −
ζs
(1− τ˜) ζ
s
3 =
ζs
(1− τ˜)
ζs4 = −
(1− θ)ζs
(1− τ˜) ζ
s
5 =
Y ϕ+1 (1− ϕζs)
(1− βθ)
where ζs ≡ δs−(1−τ˜)γsσ+δsϕ is a steady-state symmetric solution of the optimal policy
problem just stated. Consider now the monetary union in area F .47 Suppose that for
all i ∈ [0, 12), Πit = Zit = 1 at all times. Hence, F it = F , Kit = K and F
i
t
Kit
= 1 for all i
and t. We want to argue that even in this case, given other policy makers’ strategies,
Πit = 1 for all t and i ∈ [12 , 1] is the optimal best response of the central bank in area
F . If for all i ∈ [12 , 1], Πit = 1 at all times, the optimal policy problem of the monetary
46Notice that this Lagrangian incorporates additional constraints for time 0 that render the policy time-
lessly optimal.
47We follow closely Benigno and Benigno (2006).
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authority in area F can be written as maximizing:
Lb = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{∫ 1
1
2
[
Cit
1−σ
1− σ −
1
ϕ+ 1
(
Y it Z
i
t
Ait
)ϕ+1]
+ ζb,i1,t
[
Y it −
(
Pi,t
PCi,t
)−η (
αsC
i
t + (αb − αs)CitσηCF,t + (1− αb)CitσηCH,t
)]
+ ζb,i2,t
[
Kit −
(
Y it
Ait
)ϕ+1
Zit
ϕ
(1 + µit)(1− τ i)
ε
ε− 1
]
− ζb,i2,t−1θΠεi,tKit
+ ζb,i3,t
[
F it − Y it Ci−σt
P it
PCi,t
]
− ζb,i3,t−1θΠ(ε−1)i,t F it
+ ζb,i4,t
F it −Kit
(
1− θΠε−1i,t
1− θ
) 1
ε−1

+ ζb,i5,t
Zit − θZit−1Πεi,t − (1− θ)
(
1− θΠε−1i,t
1− θ
) ε
ε−1

+ ζb,i6,t
[(
C∗F,t
C∗F,t−1
)−σ
PF,t
P ∗F,t
P ∗F,t−1
PF,t−1
Π−1F,t −
(
Cit
Cit−1
)−σ
Pi,t
PCi,t
PCi,t−1
Pi,t−1
Π−1i,t
]
di
+
∫ 1
2
0
ζb,i7,t
[
Y it −
(
Pi,t
PCi,t
)−η (
αsC
i
t + (αb − αs)CitσηCH,t + (1− αb)CitσηCF,t
)]
+ ζb,i8,t
[
(1 + µit)(1− τ)
ε
ε− 1
(
Y it
Ait
)ϕ+1
− Pi,t
PCi,t
Y it C
i
t
−σ
]
di
}
(75)
where CH,t ≡ 2
∫ 1
2
0 C
i
t
1−ση
di and CF,t ≡ 2
∫ 1
1
2
Cit
1−ση
di and Pi,t/PCi,t and P
∗
F,t/PF,t
are determined consistently with (18), the foreign counterpart of (18), (66) and (67).
Assume that µit = µ, A
i
t = 1, τ
i = τ and Zi−1 = 1 for all i ∈ [0, 1] and t. Moreover,
suppose that Zi−1 = 1 for all i ∈ [0, 1]. Then, it can be shown that zero-inflation is
a optimal policy, because such a policy is consistent with the first-order conditions of
(75). Indeed, if Zit = Πi,t = 1 for all t and i ∈ [12 , 1], the first-order conditions with
respect to Cit , Y
i
t for all i and Z
i
t , K
i
t , F
i
t and Πi,t all i ∈ [12 , 1] at the symmetric
deterministic steady state can written as:
C−σ = ζb1δb + ζ
b
7(1− δb)− ζb3σγbY C−σ−1 − ζb8σ(1− γb)Y C−σ−1
Y ϕ = ζb1 − ζb2(ϕ+ 1)Y ϕ(1− τ˜)− ζb3C−σ
0 = ζb1(1− δb) + ζb7δb − ζb3σ(1− γb)Y C−σ−1 − ζb8σγbY C−σ−1
0 = ζb7 + ζ
b
8
[
(ϕ+ 1)Y ϕ(1− τ˜)− C−σ]
Y ϕ+1 = −ζb2ϕY ϕ+1(1− τ˜) + ζb5(1− βθ)
ζb2(1− θ) = ζb4
ζb3(1− θ) = −ζb4
ζb2θεK = −ζb3θ(ε− 1)F + ζb4
θ
1− θK (76)
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where γb =
αb
2αb−1 and δb ≡ (1− ση)αb + ησγb. As a consequence:
Y = (1− τ˜)− 1σ+ϕ
C = Y
F = K =
Y C−σ
1− βθ =
Y ϕ+1(1− τ˜)
1− βθ
Π = ΠH = ΠF = Z = 1
ζb1 = Y
ϕ (1− ϕζb) ζb2 = −
ζb
(1− τ˜) ζ
b
3 =
ζb
(1− τ˜) ζ
b
4 = −
(1− θ)ζb
(1− τ˜)
ζb5 =
Y ϕ+1 (1− ϕζb)
1− βθ ζ
b
7 = −Y ϕϕ (ζw − ζb) ζb8 =
(ζw − ζb)
(1− τ˜) (77)
where ζb ≡ 12 τ˜σ+ϕ − δb−1+(1/2)τ˜(1−2γb)σ+(1−2δb)ϕ and ζw ≡
τ˜
σ+ϕ Hence, being the best response for
both monetary union and the small open economy policy makers, zero inflation is a
Nash equilibrium solution under regime A.
Consider now the case of regime B and suppose that the central bank of area H set
ΠH,t = 1 for all t. In this case, given the symmetry of area H small open economies,
it has to be that Πi,t = 1 for all t and i ∈ [0, 12). Hence, under regime B the optimal
policy problem of the policy maker of the area F is identical to the one stated in
(75) for regime A and zero inflation is a best response of policymaker in area F to
a zero-inflation policy of the policy maker in the area H. However, under regime B,
the optimal policy problem of the policy maker in area H is symmetric to the one of
area F . Thus, we can conclude that zero inflation is a Nash equilibrium policy at the
deterministic steady state even under regime B.
D The purely quadratic approximations to the
welfare and the optimal policies under regimes
A, B and C
In order to recover the optimal policies, we need to approximate up to the second order
single country representative agent utility given by (1).
D.1 The second-order approximation to the utility
Recall that according to (1), the period t utility is Ut ≡ C
i
t
1−σ
1−σ − 1ϕ+1
(
Y it Z
i
t
Ait
)ϕ+1
. First,
we approximate the utility derived from private consumption for generic region i as:
Cit
1−σ
1− σ '
C1−σ
1− σ + C
1−σ
(
cˆit +
1
2
(cˆit)
2
)
− σ
2
C1−σ(cˆit)
2 + t.i.p. (78)
where cˆit stands for the log-deviations of private consumption from the deterministic
steady state and t.i.p. stand for ”terms independent of policy”. Then, we approximate
labor disutility. Since Zit =
∫ 1
0
(
pt(hi)
Pi,t
)−ε
dhi, as showed by Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005),
it follows that:
zˆit '
ε
2
V arhi(pt(h
i)) (79)
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In words, the approximation of Zit around the symmetric steady state is purely quadratic.
Moreover, following Woodford (2001, NBER WP8071) it is possible to show that
∞∑
t=0
βtV arhi(pt(h
i)) = 1λ
∞∑
t=0
βtpi2i,t with λ ≡ (1−θ)(1−βθ)θ . Therefore, labor disutility can
be approximated up to the second order as:
1
ϕ+ 1
(
Y it Z
i
t
Ait
)ϕ+1
' 1
ϕ+ 1
Y ϕ+1 + Y ϕ+1
(
yˆit +
1
2
(yˆit)
2
)
+ Y ϕ+1
ε
2λ
(pii,t)
2 +
ϕ
2
Y ϕ+1(yˆit)
2
− (ϕ+ 1)Y ϕ+1yˆitait + t.i.p. (80)
By combining (78) and (80) and recalling that at the steady state C−σ = (1 − τ˜)Y ϕ,
we can express the second-order approximation of Ut as fraction of steady state con-
sumption in the following way:
Ut − U
UCC
' 1
1− τ˜
[
(1− τ˜)cˆit − (1− τ˜)
(σ − 1)
2
(cˆit)
2 − yˆit −
ϕ+ 1
2
(yˆit)
2 − ε
2λ
(pii,t)
2
]
(81)
Therefore, the second-order approximation to the welfare of the region i representative
agent is given by:
1
1− τ˜
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[
(1− τ˜)cˆit − (1− τ˜)
(σ − 1)
2
(cˆit)
2 − yˆit −
ϕ+ 1
2
(yˆit)
2 − ε
2λ
(pii,t)
2
]
+ t.i.p.
(82)
D.2 The case of the small open economy
The expression in (82) can be rewritten in matrix form as:
1
1− τ˜
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[
sˆi
′
t ws −
1
2
sˆi
′
tWs,ssˆ
i
t + sˆ
i′
tWs,eeˆ
i
t
]
+ t.i.p. (83)
where:
sˆi
′
t ≡
[
yˆit, cˆ
i
t, pii,t
]
w′s ≡ [−1, (1− τ˜), 0] eˆi
′
t ≡
[
cˆH,t, cˆF,t, aˆ
i
t, µˆ
i
t
]
Ws,s ≡
 (ϕ+ 1) 0 00 (1− τ˜)(σ − 1) 0
0 0 ελ
 Ws,e ≡
 0 0 (ϕ+ 1) 00 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

and with i ∈ [0, 12), cˆH,t ≡ 2 ∫ 120 cˆjtdj and cˆF,t ≡ 2 ∫ 11
2
cˆjtdj. In order to recover a purely
quadratic approximation to the welfare of the small open economy, we have to use the
second-order approximations both to the aggregate demand and the Phillips curves.
The second-order approximation to the demand curve can be written as:
0 '
[
sˆi
′
t gs − eˆi
′
t ge +
1
2
sˆi
′
t Gs,ssˆ
i
t − sˆi
′
t Gs,ee
i
t
]
+ t.o.c. (84)
where:
g′s ≡ [−1, δs, 0] g′e ≡ [−(δb − δs), −(1− δb), 0, 0]
Gs,s ≡
 −1 0 00 δs + ω1 0
0 0 0
 Gs,e ≡

0 0 0 0
ω1 + ω2 −ω2 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

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with δs ≡ αs(1− ησ) + ησγs, δb ≡ αb(1− ησ) + γbησ, γs ≡ 1αs and γb ≡
αb
2αb−1 , while:
ω1 ≡ (1− αs)ησ(σ − (1− αs)αs(1− ησ))
α2s
ω2 ≡
(1− αb)ησ
(
σ +
(
α2s + (1− 2αb)
)
(1− ησ))
αs(1− 2αb)
Moreover t.o.c. stands for terms out of control of the policy maker which include average
area variables besides the terms independent of policy.
As in Benigno and Woodford (2005), the second-order approximation to (35) can be
combined with (37) and (38) to obtain the second-order approximation to the Phillips
curve:
V0 =
1− θ
θ
(1− βθ)
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[
sˆi
′
t vs − eˆi
′
t ve +
1
2
sˆi
′
t Vs,ssˆ
i
t − sˆi
′
t Vs,eeˆ
i
t
]
+ t.o.c. (85)
where
v′s ≡ [ϕ, σγs, 0] v′e ≡ [σ(γs − γb), −σ(1− γb), −(ϕ+ 1), 1]
Vs,s ≡
 ϕ(ϕ+ 2) σγs 0σγs −ησ2 (γs − 1) γs − σ2γs 0
0 0 ε(ϕ+1)λ

Vs,e ≡
 −σ(γb − γs) −σ(1− γb) (ϕ+ 1)2 −(ϕ+ 1)ησ2γs (γb − γs) ησγ2s (1− γb) 0 0
0 0 0 0

Given (84) and (85), it is possible to rewrite (83) in a purely quadratic way. Indeed, it
is easy to show that:
ws = (1− ϕζs)gs − ζsvs
where ζs =
δs−(1−τ˜)
δsϕ+γsσ
.48 Then, we can write the second-order approximation to region i
welfare as:
− 1
(1− τ˜)
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[
1
2
sˆi
′
t Ωs,ssˆ
i
t − sˆi
′
t Ωs,eeˆ
i
t
]
+ t.o.c. (86)
where:
Ωs,s ≡Ws,s + (1− ϕζs)Gs,s − ζsVs,s Ωs,e ≡Ws,e + (1− ϕζs)Gs,e − ζsVs,e
and Ωs,s and Ω
′
s,e are respectively equal to: (1− ζs(ϕ+ 1))ϕ −ζsγsσ 0−ζsγsσ (1− τ˜)(σ − 1)− ζsσ2ηγs (1− γs) + ζsσ2γs + (1− ζsϕ)(δs + ω1) 0
0 0 (1−ζs(ϕ+1))ελ


ζsσ(γb − γs) −ζsησ2γs (γb − γs) + (1− ζsϕ) (ω1 + ω2) 0
ζsσ(1− γb) −ζsησ2γs(1− γb)− (1− ζsϕ)ω2 0
(1− ζs(ϕ+ 1))(ϕ+ 1) 0 0
ζs(ϕ+ 1) 0 0

48Notice that ζs determines also the lagrange multipliers previously recovered for the optimal policy
problem of the small economy policy maker. See Benigno and Woodford (2005).
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Alternatively, (86) can be written as:
− 1
1− τ˜
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[1
2
$1,s(yˆ
i
t)
2 +$2,scˆ
i
tyˆ
i
t +
1
2
$3,s(cˆ
i
t)
2 +
1
2
$4,s(pii,t)
2 −$5,syˆit cˆH,t
−$6,syˆit cˆF,t −$7,scˆitcˆH,t −$8,scˆitcˆF,t −$9,syˆitaˆit −$10,syˆitµˆit
]
+ t.o.c. (87)
where:
$1,s ≡ [1− ζs(ϕ+ 1)]ϕ
$2,s ≡ −ζsγsσ
$3,s ≡ (1− τ˜)(σ − 1)− ζsσ2ηγs (1− γs) + ζsσ2γs + (1− ζsϕ)(δs + ω1)
$4,s ≡ [1− ζs(ϕ+ 1)] ε
λ
$5,s ≡ ζsσ(γb − γs)
$6,s ≡ ζsσ(1− γb)
$7,s ≡ −ζsησ2γs (γb − γs) + (1− ζsϕ) (ω1 + ω2)
$8,s ≡ −ζsησ2γs(1− γb)− (1− ζsϕ)ω2
$9,s ≡ [1− ζs(ϕ+ 1)] (ϕ+ 1)
$10,s ≡ ζs(ϕ+ 1) (88)
The next step is to express the approximations in (86) in terms of deviations from the
policy target of the small open economy policy maker. This target can be determined
by maximizing (86) subject to good market clearing written as in (32), i.e.,:
yˆit = δscˆ
i
t + (δb − δs)cˆH,t + (1− δb)cˆF,t i ∈ [0,
1
2
) (89)
The Lagrangian associated to this problem can be written as:
Ls =
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[
1
2
sˆs
′
t Ωs,ssˆ
s
t − sˆs
′
t Ωs,eeˆ
i
t + φ
s
t
(
sˆs
′
t gs − eˆi
′
t ge
)]
(90)
where sˆst indicates the target for sˆ
i
t. The first-order conditions of L
s with respect to
sˆs
′
t and φ
s
t can be read as:
Ωs,ssˆ
s
t − Ωs,eeˆit = −φstgs
gssˆ
s
t − geeˆit = 0 (91)
Alternatively, condition (91) can be read as:
$1,syˆ
s
t +$2,scˆ
s
t −$5,scˆH,t −$6,scˆF,t −$9,saˆit −$10,sµˆit = φst
$3,scˆ
s
t +$2,syˆ
s
t −$7,scˆH,t −$8,scˆF,t = −δsφst
$4,spii,t = 0
yˆst = δscˆ
s
t + (δb − δs)cˆH,t + (1− δb)cˆF,t (92)
for all i ∈ [0, 12) and where φst is the lagrange multiplier of (89). Notice that from
the perspective of the small open monetary authority cˆH,t and cˆF,t are taken as exoge-
nous. Then, it can be shown that by using equations (20),49 conditions in (92) can be
49In fact, given the system of equations in (92) – which allows us to determine the target for cˆit yˆ
i
t and pi
i
t
–, we can recover the target for sˆiH,t and sˆiF,t, using conditions (20).
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rewritten as:
[1− ζs(ϕ+ 1)]m̂ce,si,t = ζs(ϕ+ 1)µˆit + κsH sˆsiH,t + κsF sˆsiF,t
yˆst = cˆ
s
t +
[
1− δb
σ(2γb − 1) −
1− δs
σγs
]
sˆsiH,t −
1− δb
σ(2γb − 1) sˆ
s
iF,t
sˆsiF,t = sˆ
s
iH,t − σ(2γb − 1)(cˆF,t − cˆH,t)
sˆsiH,t = κ
s
aaˆ
i
t + κ
s
µµˆ
i
t + κ
s
cH cˆH,t + κ
s
cF cˆF,t (93)
where m̂ce,st ≡ ϕyˆst + σcˆst − (1 +ϕ)aˆit + (αb −αs)sˆsiH,t + (1−αb)sˆsiF,t, while κsH , κsF , κsa,
κsµ, κ
s
cH and κ
s
cF are defined as:
κsH ≡ −
as1
σγsδs
+
as2
σ(2γb − 1)δs +
(
γb
2γb − 1 −
1
γs
)
[1− ζs(ϕ+ 1)]
κsF ≡ −
as2
σ(2γb − 1)δs −
1− γb
2γb − 1 [1− ζs(ϕ+ 1)]
κsa ≡
1
as3
[1− ζs(ϕ+ 1)] (1 + ϕ)
κsµ ≡
1
as3
ζs(1 + ϕ)
κscH ≡ −
1
as3
[
as2
δs
+ (1− ζs(1 + ϕ))(σ + ϕδb)
]
κscF ≡
1
as3
[
as2
δs
− (1− ζs(1 + ϕ)) (1− δb)ϕ
]
(94)
with:
as1 ≡ −ζsσ2ηγs(1− γs) + (1− ζsϕ)ω1 + ζsσδs(1− γs) + ζsσγs(1− δs)
as2 ≡ −ζsσ2ηγs(1− γb)− (1− ζsϕ)ω2 + ζsσδs(1− γb) + ζsσγs(1− δb)
as3 ≡ [1− ζs(1 + ϕ)]
[
(ϕ+ σ)
δs
γsσ
+
(1− δs)
γs
]
+
as1
γsδsσ
(95)
The first condition in (93) expresses the target for the fluctuations of the efficient
firms’ marginal cost as a function of mark-up shocks and two terms of trade that are
relevant for small open economy viewpoint; the second and the third conditions rewrite
the market clearing equation (89) and condition (20) using conditions (20) and (21).
Finally, the last condition expresses sˆsiH,t in terms of the exogenous shocks. By using
(20) and (92), we can rewrite (58) in terms of gaps as:50
− 1
(1− τ˜)
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[
1
2
$1,s(y˜
s
t )
2 +
1
2
$11,s(s˜
s
iH,t)
2 +
1
2
$12,s(s˜
s
iF,t)
2 +
1
2
$4,s(pii,t)
2
]
+ t.o.c.
(96)
50To recover condition (87) first we rewrote the approximation in (58) in deviations from the target using
(92). Then, we use the conditions in (20) in deviations from the target to express the welfare approximation
as a function solely of y˜st , s˜
s
iH,t, s˜
s
iF,t and pii,t.
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where
$11,s ≡ 1
σγs
[
2$2,s
(
δs
σγs
+
1− δb
σ(2γb − 1)
)
+
1
σ2γ2s
$3,s
]
$12,s ≡ −2$2,s
σγs
1− δb
σ(2γb − 1) (97)
The timelessly optimal monetary policy can be retrieved by maximizing (96) with
respect to y˜st , s˜
s
iH,t, s˜
s
iF,t and pii,t subject to the following sequence of constraints:
y˜st =
[
δs
σγs
+
1− δb
σ(2γb − 1)
]
s˜siH,t −
1− δb
σ(2γb − 1) s˜
s
iF,t
pii,t = λ
[
(ϕ+ σ)y˜st +
(
γs − δs
γs
− γb − δb
2γb − 1
)
s˜siH,t +
γb − δb
2γb − 1 s˜
s
iF,t
]
+ βEt{pii,t+1}+ υsi,t
(98)
for all t where:
υsi,t =
λ
1− ζs (ϕ+ 1)
[(
1 + κsµ(κ
s
H + κ
s
F )
)
µˆit + (κ
s
a(κ
s
H + κ
s
F )) aˆ
i
t
+ (κscH(κ
s
H + κ
s
F ) + κ
s
Fσ(2γb − 1)) cˆH,t + (κscF (κsH + κsF )− κsFσ(2γb − 1)) cˆF,t] (99)
and the constraint on pii,0 implied by the timeless perspective. The constraints in (98)
are recovered from (89) and (39), using again (20). The Lagrangian of the optimal
monetary policy problem of the small open economy can then be written as:
Ls =
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
{[
1
2
$1,s(y˜
s
t )
2 +
1
2
$11,s(s˜
s
iH,t)
2 +
1
2
$12,s(s˜
s
iF,t)
2 +
1
2
$4,s(pii,t)
2
]
+ ψs1,t
[
pii,t − λ
(
(ϕ+ σ)y˜st +
(
γs − δs
γs
− γb − δb
2γb − 1
)
s˜siH,t +
γb − δb
2γb − 1 s˜
s
iF,t
)
− υsi,t
]
− ψs1,t−1pii,t
+ ψs2,t
[
y˜st −
(
δs
σγs
+
1− δb
σ(2γb − 1)
)
s˜siH,t +
1− δb
σ(2γb − 1) s˜
s
iF,t
]}
(100)
Minimizing Ls with respect to y˜st , s˜siH,t, s˜siF,t and pii,t lead to the following first-order
conditions:
$1,sy˜
s
t = ψ
s
1,tλ(ϕ+ σ)− ψs2,t
$11,ss˜
s
iH,t = ψ
s
1,tλ
(
γs − δs
γs
− γb − δb
2γb − 1
)
+ ψs2,t
(
δs
σγs
+
1− δb
σ(2γb − 1)
)
$12,ss˜
s
iF,t = ψ
s
1,tλ
γb − δb
2γb − 1 − ψ
s
2,t
1− δb
σ(2γb − 1)
$4,spi
i
t = −
(
ψs1,t − ψs1,t−1
)
(101)
D.3 The case of the monetary union
By (82), the second-order approximation to the average welfare of the household living
in the area H can be read as:
1
(1− τ˜)
∞∑
t=0
βt2
∫ 1
2
0
E0
[
sˆi
′
t ws −
1
2
sˆi
′
tWs,ssˆ
i
t + sˆ
i′
tWs,uuˆ
i
t
]
di+ t.i.p. (102)
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sˆi
′
t ≡
[
yˆit, cˆ
i
t, pii,t
]
w′s ≡ [−1, (1− τ˜), 0] uˆi
′
t ≡
[
ait, µ
i
t
]
Ws,s ≡
 (ϕ+ 1) 0 00 (1− τ˜)(σ − 1) 0
0 0 ελ
 Ws,u ≡
 (ϕ+ 1) 00 0
0 0

As for the case of the small open economy, we can retrieve a purely quadratic approx-
imation to the welfare of the households living in area H thanks to the second-order
approximations to the demand and supply curves.
The second-order approximation to the demand curve of a generic region i in the
area H can be read as:
0 ' sˆi′t gs +
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′gSH +
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′gSF +
1
2
sˆi
′
t Gs,ssˆ
i
tdi+
1
2
∫ 1
2
0
sˆi
′
t GsH ,sH sˆ
i
tdi
+
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆi
′
t GsF ,sF sˆ
i
tdi+
1
2
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′GSH ,SH
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi+
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′GSF ,SF
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
+ sˆi
′
t Gs,SH
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi+ sˆ
i′
t Gs,SF
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi+
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′GSH ,SF
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi+ s.o.t.i.p. (103)
where:
g′s ≡ [−1, δs, 0] g′SH ≡ [0, 2(δb − δs), 0] g′SF ≡ [0, 2(1− δb), 0, ]
Gs,s ≡
 −1 0 00 δs + ω1 0
0 0 0
 GsF ,sF ≡
 0 0 00 2(1− δb) + 2ω3 0
0 0 0

GsH ,sH ≡
 0 0 00 −2ησ2(1− γ2s ) + 2(δb − δs)− 2(ω1 + ω3) 0
0 0 0

GSH ,SH ≡
 0 0 00 4 (ησ2(1− γ2s )− ησ2γb(1− γb) + 2ω1 + 2ω2 + ω3) 0
0 0 0

GSF ,SF ≡
 0 0 00 −4 (ησ2γb(1− γb) + ω3) 0
0 0 0
 Gs,SH ≡
 0 0 00 −2 (ω1 + ω2) 0
0 0 0

Gs,SF ≡
 0 0 00 2ω2 0
0 0 0
 GSH ,SF ≡
 0 0 00 4 (ησ2γb(1− γb)− ω2) 0
0 0 0

and with:
ω3 ≡ (1− αb)ησ(σ + 2(1− αb)(1− ησ))
1− 2αb
By integrating (103) over i ∈ [0, 12), we obtain:
0 '
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′hSH +
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′hSF +
1
2
∫ 1
2
0
sˆi
′
t HsH ,sH sˆ
i
tdi+
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆi
′
t HsF ,sF sˆ
i
tdi
+
1
2
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′HSH ,SH
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi+
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′HSF ,SF
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi+
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′HSH ,SF
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
+ s.o.t.i.p.
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with
h′SH ≡ [−1, δb, 0] h′SF ≡ [0, (1− δb), 0, ]
HsH ,sH ≡
 −1 0 00 −ησ2(1− γ2s ) + δb − ω3 0
0 0 0
 HsF ,sF ≡
 0 0 00 (1− δb) + ω3 0
0 0 0

HSH ,SH ≡
 0 0 00 2ησ2(1− γ2s )− 2ησ2γb(1− γb) + 2ω3 0
0 0 0

HSF ,SF ≡
 0 0 00 −2 (ησ2(1− γb)γb + 2ω3) 0
0 0 0
 HSH ,SF ≡
 0 0 00 2ησ2γb(1− γb) 0
0 0 0

A symmetric approximation can be retrieved for the good market-clearing condition of
the regions in area F , namely:
0 '
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′fSF +
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′fSH +
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆi
′
t FsF ,sF sˆ
i
tdi+
1
2
∫ 1
2
0
sˆi
′
t FsH ,sH sˆ
i
tdi
+
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′FSF ,SF
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi+
1
2
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′FSH ,SH
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi+
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′FSF ,SH
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
+s.o.t.i.p.
where fSF = hSH , fSH = hSF , FsF ,sF = HsH ,sH , FsH ,sH = HsF ,sF , FSF ,SF = HSH ,SH ,
FSH ,SH = HSF ,SF and FSF ,SH = HSH ,SF . Conversely, the second-order approximation
to the Phillips curve for the area F can be recovered:
V0 =
1− θ
θ
(1− βθ)
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[
sˆi
′
t vs +
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′vSF +
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′vSH − uˆi
′
t vu +
1
2
sˆi
′
t Vs,ssˆ
i
t
+sˆi
′
t Vs,SF
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi+ sˆ
i′
t Vs,sH
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi+
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆit′VsF ,sF sˆ
i
tdi+
1
2
∫ 1
2
0
sˆi
′
t VsH ,sH sˆ
i
tdi
+
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′VSF ,SF
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi+
1
2
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′VSH ,SH
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi+
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′VSH ,SF
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
−sˆi′t Vs,uuˆit
]
+ s.o.t.i.p. (104)
where:
v′s ≡ [ϕ, σγs, 0] v′SF ≡ [0, 2σ(γb − γs), 0] v′SH ≡ [0, 2σ(1− γb), 0] v′u ≡ [ (ϕ+ 1), −1]
Vs,s ≡
 ϕ(ϕ+ 2) σγs 0σγs ησ2 (1− γs) γs − σ2γs 0
0 0 ε(ϕ+1)λ
 Vs,SF ≡
 0 2σ (1− γb) 00 −2ησ2 (1− γb) γs 0
0 0 0

Vs,SH ≡
 0 2σ (γb − γs) 00 2ησ2γs (γs − γb) 0
0 0 0
 VsF ,sF ≡
 0 0 00 2(η − 1)σ2 (1− γb) 0
0 0 0

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VsH ,sH ≡
 0 0 00 2(η − 1)σ2 (γb − γs) 0
0 0 0
 VSF ,SF ≡
 0 0 00 −4ησ2 (1− γb)2 0
0 0 0

VSH ,SH ≡
 0 0 00 −4ησ2 (γb − γs)2 0
0 0 0
 VSF ,SH ≡
 0 0 00 −4ησ2 (1− γb) (γb − γs) 0
0 0 0

Vs,u ≡
 (ϕ+ 1)2 −(ϕ+ 1)0 0
0 0

By integrating (104) over i ∈ [12 , 1], we find that:
1
2
V0 =
1− θ
θ
(1− βθ)
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[ ∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′rSF +
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′rSH −
∫ 1
1
2
uˆitdi
′ru +
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆi
′
t RsF ,sF sˆ
i
tdi
+
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆi
′
t RsH ,sH sˆ
i
tdi+
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′RSF ,SF
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi+
1
2
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′RSH ,SH
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
+
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′RSF ,SH
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi−
∫ 1
1
2
sˆi
′
t RsF ,uuˆ
i
tdi
]
+ s.o.t.i.p. (105)
where:
r′SF ≡ [ϕ, σγb, 0] r′SH ≡ [0, σ(1− γb), 0] r′u ≡ [(ϕ+ 1), −1]
RsF ,sF ≡
 ϕ(ϕ+ 2) σγs 0σγs −ηγ2sσ2 + ηγbσ2 − γbσ2 0
0 0 ε(ϕ+1)λ
RsH ,sH ≡
 0 0 00 (η − 1)σ2 (1− γb) 0
0 0 0

RSF ,SF ≡
 0 2σ(γb − γs) 02σ(γb − γs) 2ησ2 (γ2s − γ2b ) 0
0 0 0
RSH ,SH ≡
 0 0 00 −2ησ2 (1− γb)2 0
0 0 0

RSF ,SH ≡
 0 2σ(1− γb) 00 −2ησ2 (1− γb) γb 0
0 0 0
RsF ,u ≡
 (ϕ+ 1)2 −(ϕ+ 1)0 0
0 0

Again, a symmetric condition can be retrieved for the regions of the area H, namely:
1
2
V0 =
1− θ
θ
(1− βθ)
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[ ∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′kSH +
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′kSF −
∫ 1
1
2
uˆitdi
′ku +
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆi
′
t KsH ,sH sˆ
i
tdi
+
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′KSH ,SH
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi+
1
2
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′KSF ,SF
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi+
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′KSH ,SF
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
−
∫ 1
1
2
sˆi
′
t KsH ,uuˆ
i
tdi
]
+ s.o.t.i.p.
with kSH = rSF , kSF = rSH , ku = ru, KsH ,sH = RsF ,sF , KSH ,SH = RSF ,SF , KSF ,SF =
RSH ,SH , KSH ,SF = RSF ,SH and KsH ,u = RsF ,u. Then, it can be shown that:
ws = (1− ϕζb)hSH − (ζw − ζb)ϕfSH − ζbkSH − (ζw − ζb)rSH
0 = (1− ϕζb)hSF − (ζw − ζb)ϕfSF − ζbkSF − (ζw − ζb)rSF
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with ζb =
1
2
τ˜
σ+ϕ − δb−1+(1/2)τ˜(1−2γb)σ+(1−2δb)ϕ and ζw =
τ˜
σ+ϕ . Hence, we can write the second-
order approximation to the average welfare of area H as:
− 1
1− τ˜
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[∫ 1
2
0
sˆi
′
t ΩsH ,sH sˆ
i
tdi+
∫ 1
1
2
sˆi
′
t ΩsF ,sF sˆ
i
tdi+ 2
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′ΩSH ,SH
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
+2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′ΩSF ,SF
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi+ 4
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′ΩSH ,SF
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi− 2
∫ 1
2
0
sˆi
′
t ΩsH ,uuˆ
i
tdi
−2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆi
′
t ΩsF ,uuˆ
i
tdi
]
+ t.o.c. (106)
where:
ΩsH ,sH ≡Ws,s + (1− ϕζb)HsH ,sH − (ζw − ζb)ϕFsH ,sH − ζbKsH ,sH − (ζw − ζb)RsH ,sH
ΩsF ,sF ≡ (1− ζbϕ)HsF ,sF − (ζw − ζb)ϕFsF ,sF − ζbKsF ,sF − (ζw − ζb)RsF ,sF
ΩSH ,SH ≡ 12(1− ζbϕ)HSH ,SH − 12(ζw − ζb)ϕFSH ,SH − 12ζbKSH ,SH − 12(ζw − ζb)RSH ,SH
ΩSF ,SF ≡ 12(1− ζbϕ)HSF ,SF − 12(ζw − ζb)ϕFSF ,SF − 12ζbKSF ,SF − 12(ζw − ζb)RSF ,SF
ΩSH ,SF ≡ 12(1− ζbϕ)HSH ,SF − 12(ζw − ζb)ϕF ′SF ,SH − 12ζbKSH ,SF − 12(ζw − ζb)R′SF ,SH
ΩsH ,u ≡Ws,u − ζbKsH ,u ΩsF ,u ≡ −(ζw − ζb)RsF ,u (107)
and ΩsH ,sH , ΩsF ,sF , ΩSH ,SH , ΩSF ,SF , ΩSH ,SF , ΩsH ,u and ΩsF ,u are respectively equal
to:  (1− ζb(ϕ+ 1))ϕ −ζbσγs 0−ζbσγs ωsHsH 0
0 0 (1−ζb(ϕ+1))ελ

 −(ζw − ζb)(ϕ+ 1)ϕ −(ζw − ζb)σγs 0−(ζw − ζb)σγs ωsFsF 0
0 0 − ((ζw−ζb)(ϕ+1))ελ

 0 −ζbσ (γb − γs) 0−ζbσ (γb − γs) ωSHSH 0
0 0 0

 0 −(ζw − ζb)σ (γb − γs) 0−(ζw − ζb)σ (γb − γs) ωSFSF 0
0 0 0

 0 −ζbσ (1− γb) 0−(ζw − ζb)σ (1− γb) ωSHSF 0
0 0 0

 (1− ζb(ϕ+ 1))(ϕ+ 1) ζb(ϕ+ 1)0 0
0 0
  −(ζw − ζb)(ϕ+ 1)2 (ζw − ζb)(ϕ+ 1)0 0
0 0

with:
ωsHsH ≡ (σ − 1) (1− τ˜)
+ (1− ζbϕ)
(−ησ2 (1− γ2s)+ δb − ω3)
− (ζw − ζb)ϕ(1− δb + ω3)
− ζb
(−ησ2γ2s + ησ2γb − σ2γb)
− (ζw − ζb)
(
ησ2 (1− γb)− σ2 (1− γb)
)
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ωsFsF ≡ (1− ζbϕ)(1− δb + ω3)
− (ζw − ζb)ϕ(−ησ2
(
1− γ2s
)
+ δb − ω3)
− ζb
(
ησ2 (1− γb)− σ2 (1− γb)
)
+ (ζw − ζb)
(
ησ2γ2s − ησ2γb + σ2γb
)
ωSHSH ≡ (1− ζbϕ)(ησ2
(
1− γ2s − γb (1− γb)
)
+ ω3)
+ (ζw − ζb)ϕ(ησ2γb (1− γb) + ω3)
+ ζbησ
2
(
γ2b − γ2s
)
+ (ζw − ζb)ησ2 (1− γb)2
ωSFSF ≡ −(1− ζbϕ)(ησ2γb (1− γb) + ω3)
− (ζw − ζb)ϕ(ησ2
(
1− γ2s − γb (1− γb)
)
+ ω3)
+ ζbησ
2 (1− γb) 2
+ (ζw − ζb)ησ2
(
γ2b − γ2s
)
ωSHSF ≡ (1− ζbϕ)ησ2γb (1− γb)
− (ζw − ζb)ϕησ2γb (1− γb)
+ ζbησ
2 (1− γb) γb
+ (ζw − ζb)ησ2 (1− γb) γb
Now, we rewrite the welfare approximation in (106) as:
− 2
1− τ˜
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[
1
2
∫ 1
2
0
(
sˆit − 2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
)′
ΩsH ,sH
(
sˆit − 2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
)
di
+
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
(
sˆit − 2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
)′
ΩsF ,sF
(
sˆit − 2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
)
di
−
∫ 1
2
0
(
sˆit − 2
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
)′
ΩsH ,u
(
uˆit − 2
∫ 1
2
0
uˆitdi
)
di
−
∫ 1
1
2
(
sˆit − 2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
)′
ΩsF ,u
(
uˆit − 2
∫ 1
1
2
uˆitdi
)
di
+
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′(ΩsH ,sH + ΩSH ,SH )
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
+
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′(ΩsF ,sF + ΩSF ,SF )
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
+2
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′ΩSH ,SF
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
−2
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′ΩsH ,u
∫ 1
2
0
uˆitdi
−2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′ΩsF ,u
∫ 1
1
2
uˆitdi
]
+ t.o.c. (108)
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Notice that the components expressed as the difference between specific-country and
average-union variables can be considered terms out of control of the policy maker (even
if they should be taken into account in the welfare evaluation). Indeed, movements
in the common nominal interest rate can just influence the average union economic
performance. Thus, (108) can be read as:
− 2
1− τ˜
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′(ΩsH ,sH + ΩSH ,SH )
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi+
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′(ΩsF ,sF + ΩSF ,SF )
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
+2
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′ΩSH ,SF
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi− 2
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′ΩsH ,u
∫ 1
2
0
uˆitdi− 2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′ΩsF ,u
∫ 1
1
2
uˆitdi
]
+ t.o.c. (109)
The last step consists in rewriting (109) in terms of gaps with respect to the target of
the policymaker of the monetary union. In order to do so, first consider that by (109)
it follows that:
− 1
1− τ˜
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[
1
2
sˆ′H,t(ΩsH ,sH + ΩSH ,SH )sˆH,t +
1
2
sˆ′F,t(ΩsF ,sF + ΩSF ,SF )sˆF,t
+sˆ′H,tΩSH ,SF sˆF,t − sˆ′H,tΩsH ,uuˆH,t − sˆ′F,tΩsF ,uuˆF,t
]
+ t.o.c. (110)
Notice that the welfare approximation in (110) can be rewritten as:
− 1
1− τ˜
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[1
2
$1,byˆ
2
H,t +$2,bcˆH,tyˆH,t +
1
2
$3,bcˆ
2
H,t +
1
2
$4,bpi
2
H,t +
1
2
$5,byˆ
2
F,t
+$6,bcˆF,tyˆF,t +
1
2
$7,bcˆ
2
F,t +$8,byˆH,tcˆF,t +$9,byˆF,tcˆH,t +$10,bcˆH,tcˆF,t
−$11,byˆH,taˆH,t −$12,byˆH,tµˆH,t −$13,byˆF,taˆF,t −$14,byˆF,tµˆF,t
]
+ t.o.c.
(111)
where:
$1,b ≡ [1− ζb(ϕ+ 1)]ϕ
$2,b ≡ −ζbγbσ
$3,b ≡ (σ − 1)(1− τ˜) + (1− ζbϕ)δb − (ζw − ζb)ϕ(1− δb)− ησ2γb(1− γb)(1− ζwϕ+ ζw)
+ σ2[γbζb + (ζw − ζb)(1− γb)]
$4,b ≡ [1− ζb(ϕ+ 1)] ε
λ
$5,b ≡ −(ζw − ζb)(ϕ+ 1)ϕ
$6,b ≡ −(ζw − ζb)γbσ
$7,b ≡ (1− ζbϕ)(1− δb)− (ζw − ζb)ϕδb − ησ2γb(1− γb)(1− ζwϕ+ ζw)
+ σ2[ζb(1− γb) + (ζw − ζb)γb]
$8,b ≡ −ζb(1− γb)σ
$9,b ≡ −(ζw − ζb)(1− γb)σ
$10,b ≡ ησ2γb (1− γb) (1− ζwϕ+ ζw)
$11,b ≡ [1− ζb(ϕ+ 1)](ϕ+ 1)
$12,b ≡ ζb(ϕ+ 1)
$13,b ≡ −(ζw − ζb)(ϕ+ 1)2
$14,b ≡ (ζw − ζb)(ϕ+ 1) (112)
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To determine the target of the monetary authority in area H we maximize (108)
subject to:
yˆH,t = δbcˆH,t + (1− δb)cˆF,t
yˆF,t = δbcˆF,t + (1− δb)cˆH,t (113)
The Lagrangian associated to this problem can be written:
Lb =
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[
1
2
sˆb
′
H,t(ΩsH ,sH + ΩSH ,SH )sˆ
b
H,t +
1
2
sˆb
′
F,t(ΩsF ,sF + ΩSF ,SF )sˆ
b
F,t
+ sˆb
′
H,tΩSH ,SF sˆ
b
F,t − sˆb
′
H,tΩsH ,uuˆH,t − sˆb
′
F,tΩsF ,uuˆF,t
+ φbH,t
(
sˆb
′
H,thSH + sˆ
b′
F,thSF
)
+ φbF,t
(
sˆb
′
F,tfSF + sˆ
b′
H,tfSH
)]
(114)
By the first-order conditions of Lb with respect to sˆb
′
H,t, sˆ
b′
F,t, φ
b
H,t and φ
b
F,t we obtain:
(ΩsH ,sH + ΩSH ,SH )sˆ
b
H,t + ΩSH ,SF sˆ
b
F,t − ΩsH ,uuˆH,t = −φbH,thSH − φbF,tfSH
(ΩsF ,sF + ΩSF ,SF )sˆ
b
F,t + Ω
′
SH ,SF
sˆbH,t − ΩsF ,uuˆF,t = −φbF,tfSF − φbH,thSF
hSH sˆ
b
H,t + hSF sˆ
b
F,t = 0
fSF sˆ
b
F,t + fSH sˆ
b
H,t = 0 (115)
Alternatively, we can rewrite (115) as:
$1,byˆ
b
H,t +$2,bcˆ
b
H,t +$8,bcˆ
b
F,t −$11,baˆH,t −$12,bµˆH,t = φbH,t
$5,byˆ
b
F,t +$6,bcˆ
b
F,t +$9,bcˆ
b
H,t −$13,baˆF,t −$14,bµˆF,t = φbF,t
$2,byˆ
b
H,t +$3,bcˆ
b
H,t +$9,byˆ
b
F,t +$10,bcˆ
b
F,t = −(δbφbH,t + (1− δb)φbF,t)
$6,byˆ
b
F,t +$7,bcˆ
b
F,t +$8,byˆ
b
H,t +$10,bcˆ
b
H,t = −(δbφbF,t + (1− δb)φbH,t)
$4,bpiH,t = 0
yˆbH,t = δbcˆ
b
H,t + (1− δb)cˆF,t
yˆbF,t = δbcˆ
b
F,t + (1− δb)cˆbH,t (116)
Given (21), it can be shown that according to (116):51
[1− ζb(ϕ+ 1)] m̂ce,bH,t = ζb(ϕ+ 1)µˆH,t + κbH sˆbHF,t
− (ζw − ζb)(ϕ+ 1)m̂ce,bF,t = (ζw − ζb)(ϕ+ 1)µˆF,t + κbF sˆbHF,t
yˆbH,t = cˆ
b
H,t −
(1− δb)
σ(2γb − 1) sˆ
b
HF,t
yˆbF,t = cˆ
b
F,t +
(1− δb)
σ(2γb − 1) sˆ
b
HF,t
sˆbHF,t = κ
b
a(aˆF,t − aˆH,t) + κbµ(µˆF,t − µˆH,t) + κbµH µˆH,t (117)
51This result is not straightforward. A formal proof is available under request.
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where m̂ce,bH,t and m̂c
e,b
F,t are defined consistently with (42) and
κbH ≡
(γb − δb) (1− (2ζb − ζw)(ϕ+ 1))
2(2γb − 1)
κbF ≡
(γb − δb) (1− (2ζb − ζw)(ϕ+ 1))
2(2γb − 1)
κba ≡
4(ζw − ζb)(ϕ+ 1)2σ(2γb − 1)
ab
[1− ζb(ϕ+ 1)]
κbµ ≡ −
4(ζw − ζb)(ϕ+ 1)σ(2γb − 1)
ab
[1− ζb(ϕ+ 1)]
κbµH ≡ −
4(ζw − ζb)(ϕ+ 1)σ(2γb − 1)
ab
(118)
where:
ab ≡ (σ(2δb − 1) + ϕ(2γb − 1)) (1− ζw(ϕ+ 1))2 − (σ + ϕ)(2δb − 1) (1− (2ζw − ζw)(ϕ+ 1))2
The first two conditions in (117) determine implicitly the target for the fluctuations in
the efficient marginal cost in areas H and F , whereas the other conditions correspond
to the good-market clearings and the condition that expresses the target for terms-of-
trade fluctuations as a function of the exogenous shocks.
By conditions (21) and (116), we can rewrite the objective of the policy maker of
the monetary union in area H in deviations from the policy targets as:52
− 1
(1− τ˜)
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[
1
2
$15,b(y˜
b
H,t)
2 +
1
2
$16,b(s˜
b
HF,t)
2 +
1
2
$17,b(y˜
b
F,t)
2 +
1
2
$4,bpi
2
H,t
]
+t.o.c.
(119)
where:
$15,b ≡ 1
(2δb − 1)
[
δb ($2,b −$6,b) + 1
2
($3,b −$7,b)− (1− δb) ($8,b −$9,b)
]
+$1,b +$2,w +
1
2
$3,w +$5,w +
1
2
$6,w +$7,w +$10,b
$16,b ≡ 1
σ2(2γb − 1)2 [(1− δb)(2δb − 1)($2,w +$5,w) + (1− δb)δb($3,w +$6,w)
−(1− δb)(2δb − 1)$7,w − (1− δb)2$10,b
]
$17,b ≡− 1
(2δb − 1) [δb ($2,b −$6,b) +
1
2
($3,b −$7,b)− (1− δb) ($8,b −$9,b)]
+$5,b +$2,w +
1
2
$3,w +$5,w +
1
2
$6,w +$7,w +$10,b (120)
with:
$2,w ≡ −ζwγsσ
$3,w ≡ (1− τ˜)(σ − 1) + (ζwσ2 + (1− ζwϕ))− (1− γ2s )ησ2(ζw + (1− ζwϕ))
$5,w ≡ −ζwσ(γb − γs)
$6,w ≡
(
1− γ2s − 2 (1− γb) γb
)
ησ2 (ζw + (1− ϕζw))
$7,w ≡ −σ (1− γb) ζw
52As for the case of the small of open economy, first we show that conditions (116) determine the policy
target of the monetary union, i.e., that (62) can be rewritten in deviations from the allocation satisfying
(116). Then, we use condition (21) to express (62) as a function exclusively of y˜bH,t, y˜
b
F,t and s˜
b
HF,t.
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At the same time, we can rewrite the constraints to the optimal policy problem as:
y˜bH,t = y˜
b
F,t +
(2δb − 1)
σ(2γb − 1) s˜
b
HF,t
piH,t = λ
[
(ϕ+ σ)y˜bH,t +
(γb − δb)
(2γb − 1) s˜
b
HF,t
]
+ βEt{piH,t+1}+ υbH,t
piF,t = λ
[
(ϕ+ σ)y˜bF,t −
(γb − δb)
(2γb − 1) s˜
b
HF,t
]
+ βEt{piF,t+1}+ υbF,t
for all t where:
υbH,t ≡
λ
1− ζb(ϕ+ 1)
[(
1 + κbHκ
b
µH
)
µˆH,t + κ
b
Hκ
b
µ(µˆF,t − µˆH,t) + κbHκba(aˆF,t − aˆH,t)
]
υbF,t ≡ −
λ
(ζw − ζb)(ϕ+ 1)
[(
1 + κbFκ
b
µH
)
µˆH,t + κ
b
Fκ
b
µ(µˆF,t − µˆH,t) + κbFκba(aˆF,t − aˆH,t)
]
(121)
Then, the optimal policy problem of the big economy policy maker can be solved by
minimizing the following Lagrangian:
Lb =
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
{[
1
2
$15,b(y˜
b
H,t)
2 +
1
2
$16,b(s˜
b
HF,t)
2 +
1
2
$17,b(y˜
b
F,t)
2 +
1
2
$4,bpi
2
H,t
]
+ ψb1,t
[
piH,t − λ
(
(ϕ+ σ)y˜bH,t +
γb − δb
2γb − 1 s˜
b
HF,t
)
− υbH,t
]
− ψb1,t−1piH,t
+ ψb2,t
[
piF,t − λ
(
(ϕ+ σ)y˜bF,t −
γb − δb
2γb − 1 s˜
b
HF,t
)
− υbF,t
]
− ψb2,t−1piF,t
+ ψb3,t
[
y˜bH,t − y˜bF,t −
2δb − 1
σ(2γb − 1) s˜
b
HF,t
]}
(122)
with respect to y˜bH,t, s˜
b
HF,t, y˜
b
F,t and piH,t. The corresponding first-order conditions are:
$15,by˜
b
H,t = ψ
b
1,tλ(ϕ+ σ)− ψb3,t
$16,bs˜
b
FH,t = ψ
b
1,tλ
γb − δb
2γb − 1 − ψ
b
2,tλ
γb − δb
2γb − 1 + ψ
b
3,t
2δb − 1
σ(2γb − 1)
$17,by˜
b
F,t = ψ
b
2,tλ(ϕ+ σ) + ψ
b
3,t
$4,bpiH,t = −
(
ψs1,t − ψs1,t−1
)
(123)
The solution to this problem allows us to determine the best response of area H
policy maker under regime B, given the state-contingent path of piF,t. Notice that
once the average-union variables are determined, the region-specific variables can be
recovered directly from the equilibrium conditions, namely (22), (23), (32), its foreign
counterpart, (39) and its foreign akin. At the same time, a symmetric problem can
be solved for the policy maker of the monetary union of area F to find the optimal
best response both under regime A and B. Indeed, under this formulation, the optimal
policy problem of the authority in area F is independent of whether in area H small
open economies are under monetary autonomy or share the same currency.
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D.4 The case of cooperation
If there is one single policy maker for the entire economy, then the average welfare of
the world economy can be approximated to the second order as:
1
1− τ˜
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
{∫ 1
2
0
[
sˆi
′
t ws −
1
2
sˆi
′
tWs,ssˆ
i
t + sˆ
i′
tWs,uuˆ
i
t
]
di
+
∫ 1
1
2
[
sˆi
′
t ws −
1
2
sˆi
′
tWs,ssˆ
i
t + sˆ
i′
tWs,uuˆ
i
t
]
di
}
+ t.i.p. (124)
where ws, Ws,s and Ws,u were defined in the Appendix D.2. It is easy to show that
ws = (1− ϕζw)hSH + (1− ϕζw)ϕfSH − ζwkSH − ζwrSH
ws = (1− ϕζw)hSF + (1− ϕζw)ϕfSF − ζwkSF − ζwrSF (125)
− 1
1− τ˜
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[
1
2
∫ 1
2
0
sˆi
′
t Ω
w
sH ,sH
sˆitdi+
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆi
′
t Ω
w
sF ,sF
sˆitdi+
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′ΩwSH ,SH
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
+
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′ΩwSF ,SF
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi+ 2
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′ΩwSH ,SF
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi−
∫ 1
2
0
sˆi
′
t Ω
w
sH ,u
uˆitdi
−
∫ 1
1
2
sˆi
′
t Ω
w
sF ,u
uˆitdi
]
+ t.i.p. (126)
where:
ΩwsH ,sH ≡Ws,s + (1− ϕζw)HsH ,sH + (1− ϕζw)FsH ,sH − ζwKsH ,sH − ζwRsH ,sH
ΩwsF ,sF ≡Ws,s + (1− ϕζw)HsF ,sF + (1− ϕζw)FsF ,sF − ζwRsF ,sF − ζwKsF ,sF
ΩwSH ,SH ≡ 12(1− ϕζw)HSH ,SH + 12(1− ϕζw)FSH ,SH − 12ζwKSH ,SH − 12ζwRSH ,SH
ΩwSF ,SF ≡ 12(1− ϕζw)HSF ,SF + 12(1− ϕζw)FSF ,SF − 12ζwKSF ,SF − 12ζwRSF ,SF
ΩwSH ,SF ≡ 12(1− ϕζw)HSH ,SF + 12(1− ϕζw)F ′SF ,SH − 12ζwKSH ,SF − 12ζwR′SF ,SH
ΩwsH ,u ≡Ws,u − ζwKsH ,u ΩwsF ,u ≡Ws,u − ζwRsF ,u
with ζw =
τ˜
σ+ϕ and Ω
w
sH ,sH
, ΩwSH ,SH , Ω
w
SH ,SF
and ΩwsH ,u respectively equal to: (1− ζw(ϕ+ 1))ϕ −σγsζw 0−σγsζw (1− τ˜)(σ − 1) + (ζwσ2 + (1− ζwϕ))− (1− γ2s )ησ2(ζw + (1− ζwϕ)) 0
0 0 ε(1−ζw(ϕ+1))λ

 0 −σ (γb − γs) ζw 0−σ (γb − γs) ζw (1− γ2s − 2 (1− γb) γb) ησ2 (ζw + (1− ϕζw)) 0
0 0 0

 0 −σ (1− γb) ζw 0−σ (1− γb) ζw 2 (1− γb) γbησ2 (ζw + (1− ϕζw)) 0
0 0 0

 (1− ζw(ϕ+ 1))(ϕ+ 1) ζw(ϕ+ 1)0 0
0 0

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At the same time, ΩwsF ,sF = Ω
w
sH ,sH
, ΩwSF ,SF = Ω
w
SH ,SH
and ΩwsF ,u = Ω
w
sH ,u
. Alterna-
tively, (126) can be written as:
− 1
1− τ˜
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[
1
2
$1,w
∫ 1
0
(yˆit)
2di+$2,w
∫ 1
0
cˆityˆ
i
tdi+
1
2
$3,w
∫ 1
0
(cˆit)
2di+
1
2
$4,w
∫ 1
0
(pii,t)
2di
+ 2$5,w
(∫ 1
2
0
yˆitdi
∫ 1
2
0
cˆitdi+
∫ 1
1
2
yˆitdi
∫ 1
1
2
cˆitdi
)
+$6,w
(∫ 1
2
0
cˆitdi
∫ 1
2
0
cˆitdi+
∫ 1
1
2
cˆitdi
∫ 1
1
2
cˆitdi
)
+ 2$7,w
(∫ 1
1
2
yˆitdi
∫ 1
2
0
cˆitdi+
∫ 1
2
0
yˆitdi
∫ 1
1
2
cˆitdi
)
+ 2$8,w
∫ 1
1
2
cˆitdi
∫ 1
2
0
cˆitdi−$9,w
∫ 1
0
yˆitaˆ
i
tdi
−$10,w
∫ 1
0
yˆitµˆ
i
tdi
]
+ t.i.p. (127)
where:
$1,w ≡ [1− ζw(ϕ+ 1)]ϕ
$2,w ≡ −ζwγsσ
$3,w ≡ (1− τ˜)(σ − 1) + (ζwσ2 + (1− ζwϕ))− (1− γ2s )ησ2(ζw + (1− ζwϕ))
$4,w ≡ [1− ζw(ϕ+ 1)] ε
λ
$5,w ≡ −ζwσ(γb − γs)
$6,w ≡
(
1− γ2s − 2 (1− γb) γb
)
ησ2 (ζw + (1− ϕζw))
$7,w ≡ −σ (1− γb) ζw
$8,w ≡ 2 (1− γb) γbησ2 (ζw + (1− ϕζw))
$9,w ≡ [1− ζw(ϕ+ 1)] (ϕ+ 1)
$10,w ≡ ζw(ϕ+ 1) (128)
The target of the cooperative policy maker can be determined as maximizing (126)
subject to (32) and its foreign akin. The Lagrangian associated to this problem can be
written as:
Lw =
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[
1
2
∫ 1
2
0
sˆi
′
t Ω
w
sH ,sH
sˆitdi+
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆi
′
t Ω
w
sF ,sF
sˆitdi+
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′ΩwSH ,SH
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
+
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′ΩwSF ,SF
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi+ 2
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′ΩwSH ,SF
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
−
∫ 1
2
0
sˆi
′
t Ω
w
sH ,u
uˆitdi−
∫ 1
1
2
sˆi
′
t Ω
w
sF ,u
uˆitdi
+
∫ 1
2
0
φwi,t
(
sˆi
′
t gs +
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′gSH +
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′gSF
)
di
+
∫ 1
1
2
φwi,t
(
sˆi
′
t gs +
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′gSH +
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′gSF
)
di
]
(129)
64
By integrating the first-order conditions of Lw with respect to sˆi
′
t and φ
w
i,t, we obtain:
(ΩwsH ,sH + Ω
w
SH ,SH
)sˆH,t + Ω
w
SH ,SF
sˆF,t − ΩwsH ,uuˆH,t = −φwH,t(gs +
1
2
gSH )− φwF,t
1
2
gSF
(ΩwsF ,sF + Ω
w
SF ,SF
)sˆF,t + Ω
w′
SH ,SF
sˆH,t − ΩwsF ,uuˆF,t = −φwF,t(gs +
1
2
gSH )− φwH,t
1
2
gSF
(gs +
1
2
gSH )sˆH,t +
1
2
gSF sˆF,t = 0
(gs +
1
2
gSH )sˆF,t +
1
2
gSF sˆH,t = 0 (130)
Alternatively:
$1,wyˆ
w
H,t + ($2,w +$5,w)cˆ
w
H,t +$7,w cˆ
w
F,t −$9,waˆH,t −$10,wµˆH,t = φwH,t
$1,wyˆ
w
F,t + ($2,w +$5,w)cˆ
w
F,t +$7,w cˆ
w
H,t −$9,waˆF,t −$10,wµˆF,t = φwF,t
($2,w +$5,w)yˆ
w
H,t + ($3,w +$6,w)cˆ
w
H,t +$7,wyˆ
w
F,t +$8,w cˆ
w
F,t = −(δbφwH,t + (1− δb)φwF,t)
($2,w +$5,w)yˆ
w
F,t + ($3,w +$6,w)cˆ
w
F,t +$7,wyˆ
w
H,t +$8,w cˆ
w
H,t = −(δbφwF,t + (1− δb)φwH,t)
$4,wpiH,t = 0
$4,wpiF,t = 0
yˆwH,t = δbcˆ
w
H,t + (1− δb)cˆwF,t
yˆwF,t = δbcˆ
w
F,t + (1− δb)cˆwH,t (131)
It can be shown that the above conditions implies that:
[1− ζw(ϕ+ 1)] m̂ce,wH,t = ζw(ϕ+ 1)µˆH,t
[1− ζw(ϕ+ 1)] m̂ce,wF,t = ζw(ϕ+ 1)µˆF,t
yˆwH,t = cˆ
w
H,t −
(1− δb)
σ(2γb − 1) sˆ
w
HF,t
yˆwF,t = cˆ
w
F,t +
(1− δb)
σ(2γb − 1) sˆ
w
HF,t
sˆwHF,t = κ
w
a (aˆF,t − aˆH,t) + κwµ (µˆF,t − µˆH,t) (132)
where m̂ce,wH,t and m̂c
e,w
F,t are defined as in (42) and:
κwa ≡
(2δb − 1)(ϕ+ 1)
(2δb − 1)ϕ+ (2γb − 1)σ
κwµ ≡
(2δb − 1)ζw(ϕ+ 1)
(1− ζw(ϕ+ 1)) [(2δb − 1)ϕ+ (2γb − 1)σ] (133)
The first two conditions in (132) determine the target of the cooperative policy maker
for the fluctuations of the efficient marginal cost. The other conditions are the market
clearing conditions and the condition that expresses the target of the terms of trade
fluctuations as a function of the underlying shocks of the model. By using (20), (21)
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and the first order conditions of Lw, we can rewrite (127) in terms of deviations from
the policy target as:
− 1
1− τ˜
∞∑
t=0
βt
1
2
E0
[
$11,w(
∫ 1
2
0
(s˜wiH,t)
2di+
∫ 1
1
2
(s˜wiF,t)
2di) +$12,w((y˜
w
H,t)
2 + (y˜wF,t)
2)
+$13,w(s˜
w
HF,t)
2 +$4,w
∫ 1
0
(pii,t)
2di
]
+ t.i.p. (134)
where:
$11,w ≡ 1
σ2γ2s
[
δ2s$1,w + 2δs$2,w +$3,w
]
$12,w ≡ 1
2
$1,w +$2,w +
1
2
$3,w +$5,w +
1
2
$6,w +$7,w +
1
2
$8,w
$13,w ≡ 1
σ2(2γb − 1)2 [(2δb − 1) (1− δb)($2,w +$3,w +$5,w) + δb ((1− δb)$6,w
− (2δb − 1))$7,w − 1
2
(
(1− δb)2 + δ2b
)
$8,w
]
(135)
Given (134), the objective of policy maker of world monetary union can be written as:
− 1
1− τ˜
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[
1
2
$12,w((y˜
w
H,t)
2 + (y˜wF,t)
2) +
1
2
$13,w(s˜
w
HF,t)
2 +
1
2
$4,w(pi
2
H,t + pi
2
F,t)
]
+ t.o.c. (136)
Similarly to what done in the case of the single area currency union, we consider
the difference between region-specific and average-area variables as terms out o con-
trol of the policy maker of the monetary union. This assumption does not affect the
equilibrium optimal policy. Then, the timelessly optimal monetary policy of the world
monetary union can be retrieved by maximizing (136) subject to the following sequence
of constraints:
y˜wH,t = y˜
w
F,t +
1− δb
σ(2γb − 1) s˜
w
HF,t
piH,t = λ
[
(ϕ+ σ)y˜wH,t +
γb − δb
2γb − 1 s˜
w
HF,t
]
+ βEt{piH,t+1}+ υwH,t
piF,t = λ
[
(ϕ+ σ)y˜wF,t −
γb − δb
2γb − 1 s˜
w
HF,t
]
+ βEt{piF,t+1}+ υwF,t
piF,t − piH,t = ∆s˜wHF,t + υwHF,t (137)
for all t and the constraints on piH,0 and piF,0 that render the policy timelessly optimal.
In addition,
υwH,t ≡
λµHt
1− ζw(ϕ+ 1)
υwF,t ≡
λµFt
1− ζw(ϕ+ 1)
υwHF,t ≡ κwa (∆aˆF,t −∆aˆH,t) + κwµ (∆µˆF,t −∆µˆH,t)
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The associated Lagrangian can be written as:
Lw =
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
{[
1
2
$12,w((y˜
w
H,t)
2 + (y˜wF,t)
2) +
1
2
$13,w(s˜
w
HF,t)
2 +
1
2
$4,w(pi
2
H,t + pi
2
F,t)
]
+ ψw1,t
[
piH,t − λ
(
(ϕ+ σ)y˜wH,t +
γb − δb
2γb − 1 s˜
w
HF,t
)
− υwH,t
]
− ψw1,t−1piH,t
+ ψw2,t
[
piF,t − λ
(
(ϕ+ σ)y˜wF,t −
γb − δb
2γb − 1 s˜
w
HF,t
)
− υwF,t
]
− ψw2,t−1piF,t
+ ψw3,t
[
y˜wH,t − y˜wF,t −
2δb − 1
σ(2γb − 1) s˜
w
HF,t
]
+ ψw4,t
[
piF,t − piH,t −∆s˜wHF,t − υwHF,t
]}
(138)
The first-order conditions of Lw with respect to y˜wH,t, s˜wHF,t, y˜wF,t, piH,t and piF,t are:
$12,wy˜
w
t = ψ
w
1,tλ(ϕ+ σ)− ψw3,t
$13,ws˜
b
FH,t = ψ
w
1,tλ
γb − δb
2γb − 1 − ψ
w
2,tλ
γb − δb
2γb − 1 + ψ
w
3,t
2δb − 1
σ(2γb − 1) + ψ
w
4,t − βEt
{
ψw4,t+1
}
$12,wy˜
b
F,t = ψ
w
2,tλ(ϕ+ σ) + ψ
w
3,t
$4,wpiH,t = −
(
ψw1,t − ψw1,t−1
)
+ ψw4,t
$4,wpiF,t = −
(
ψw2,t − ψw2,t−1
)− ψw4,t (139)
E Parametrization of shocks
As anticipated in Section 6.1 we assume that:
aˆit+1 = ρaaˆ
i
t + ε
i
a,t
µˆit+1 = ρµµˆ
i
t + ε
i
µ,t (140)
where εia,t and ε
i
µ,t are white noise innovations with zero mean and standard deviation
equal to σa and σµ respectively. Moreover the innovations to productivity and mark-up
shocks can be decomposed into purely idiosyncratic and common components, i.e.,:
εia,t = ηa,t + η
i
a,t
εiµ,t = ηµ,t + η
i
µ,t
with ηia,t ≡ εia,t − ηa,t and ηiµ,t ≡ εiµ,t − ηµ,t being the idiosyncratic component where
we impose that:
Cov
{
ηia,t, η
j
a,t
}
=
{
σ2
a,ηi
i = j
0 i 6= j
and
Cov
{
ηiµ,t, η
j
µ,t
}
=
{
σ2
µ,ηi
i = j
0 i 6= j
Notice that as a consequence:
Cov
{
εia,t, ε
j
a,t
}
=
{
σ2a,η + σ
2
a,ηi
i = j
σ2a,η i 6= j
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and
Cov
{
εiµ,t, ε
j
µ,t
}
=
{
σ2µ,η + σ
2
µ,ηi
i = j
σ2µ,η i 6= j
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